Cooperative quality investment in outsourcing

Chen, Jingxian; Liang, Liang; Yang, Feng

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.01.019

Cited by 68 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Solving the first-order condition for , we get = * ( ) of (10). Substituting = * ( ) of (10) into 2 + 2 = , we have = * ( ) of (11). We thus complete the proof of Theorem 2.…”

Section: Theoremsupporting

confidence: 55%

“…Yu and Ma [9] and Li and Chen [10] study quality improvement investments in a supply chain with multiple upstream firms and one downstream firm. Chen et al [11] study quality improvement investments in a supply chain with one upstream firm and multiple downstream firms. Zhu et al [12] and Ma et al [13,14] coordinate a supply chain, where the upstream firm conducts quality improvement investment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supplier’s Joint Investments in Cost Reduction and Quality Improvement in a Decentralized Supply Chain

Zhang

Hong

2017

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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We consider a decentralized supply chain with a downstream manufacturer and an upstream supplier. The upstream supplier sells a product to the manufacturer, who faces a quality and price sensitive demand. The supplier has a chance to invest in both cost reduction and quality improvement of its product. We derive the optimal investment and pricing decisions for the supply chain members. We do so in both the centralized and the decentralized supply chains. We show that the optimal investment and pricing decisions in the decentralized supply chain may deviate from that in the centralized supply chain. We develop a mechanism to coordinate the decentralized supply chain. The developed mechanism contains four policies: wholesale price, sharing of revenue, sharing of cost reduction investment cost, and sharing of quality improvement investment cost. We also show that the developed coordination mechanism can lead to Pareto improvement.

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“…Solving the first-order condition for , we get = * ( ) of (10). Substituting = * ( ) of (10) into 2 + 2 = , we have = * ( ) of (11). We thus complete the proof of Theorem 2.…”

Section: Theoremsupporting

confidence: 55%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supplier’s Joint Investments in Cost Reduction and Quality Improvement in a Decentralized Supply Chain

Zhang

Hong

2017

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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“…(2) Dynamic competition: if the rivals show reactions simultaneously, this type of competition occurs. Also this is usually related to operational characteristics and leads to Nash game; most of the dynamic games in SC literature are unconstrained models that solved by differential systems (Xiao and Yang 2008;Zhang 2006;Dias 2010, 2013;Sinha and Sarmah 2010;Friesz et al 2011, Jain et al 2014Chen et al 2015;Nagurney et al 2015;Mousavi et al 2016;Santibanez-Gonzalez and Diabat 2016;Hjaila et al 2016a;Jahangoshai Rezaee et al 2017;Lipan et al 2017). (3) Competition with foresight: in this competition, the rivals show reactions to the entry of new comer in sequential manner and usually this is related to strategic characteristics; this competition leads to bilevel or multi-level models and stackelberg games (Drezner and Drezner 1998;Plastria and Vanhaverbeke 2008;Kucukaydın et al 2011, Zhang and Liu 2013Yue and You 2014;Zhu 2015;Drezner et al 2015;Taleizadeh and Charmchi 2015;Yang et al 2015, Esmaeilzadeh andTaleizadeh 2016;Hjaila et al 2016b;Aydin et al 2016;Ezimadu and Nwozo 2017;Genc andGiovanni 2017.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralized supply chain network design: monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly competitions under uncertainty

2017

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This paper presents the competitive supply chain network design problem in which n decentralized supply chains simultaneously enter the market with no existing rival chain, shape their networks and set wholesale and retail prices in competitive mode. The customer demand is elastic and price dependent, customer utility function is based on the Hoteling model and the chains produce identical or highly substitutable products. We construct a solution algorithm based on bi-level programming and possibility theory. In the proposed bi-level model, the inner part sets the prices based on simultaneous extra-and Stackleberg intra-chains competitions, and the outer part shapes the networks in cooperative competitions. Finally, we use a real-word study to discuss the effect of the different structures of the competitors on the equilibrium solution. Moreover, sensitivity analyses are conducted and managerial insights are offered.

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“…More recently, several studies in the management science and operations management literature have analyzed the economic implications of settings where competitors cooperate in certain business activities (Banker et al, 1998;Akcay and Tan, 2008;Ge and Hu, 2008;Wu et al, 2008;Chen and Roma, 2011;Zhang and Frazier, 2011;Kumar Jena and Sarmah, 2014;Chen et al, 2015). Zhang (2006) points out that today's supply chain economy comprises several supply chains, such as Walmart, Target, and Sears Holdings, which compete in the same business but also cooperate in material procurement, resource utilization, utility consumption, and distribution patterns.…”

Section: Literature Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%