Cooperative sequencing games with position-dependent learning effect

This paper innovatively addresses the effect of cooperation on sequencing situations with position‐dependent effects. Specifically, we ensure the convexity of the associated sequencing games under the fulfillment of certain conditions related to the neighbor switching gains. Additionally, we propose two families of allocation rules based on sharing the neighbor switching gains under two distinct procedures, each providing a path from the initial order to an optimal order. From a theoretical point of view, an axiomatization of both families of allocations is provided, and their stability is also ensured under the conditions related to convexity.

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Cooperative sequencing games with position-dependent learning effect

Cited by 3 publications

References 17 publications

Cooperative Game Theory Based Coordinated Scheduling of Two-Machine Flow-Shop and Transportation

Cooperative Game Theory Based Coordinated Scheduling of Two-Machine Flow-Shop and Transportation

A bargaining game for implementing the equal gain splitting rule in sequencing situations

Sequencing situations with position‐dependent effects under cooperation

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