Cooperative Strategies in Stopping Games

Ramsey, David; Cierpiał, Diana

doi:10.1007/978-0-8176-4834-3_21

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 12 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Earlier studies of such issues (cf. Ferenstein(1992), , Ramsey and Cierpiał(2009), Dorobantu et al(2009), Krasnosielska-Kobos and Ferenstein(2013), Ferguson(2016)) showed their complexity, and detailed models of the analyzed cases a way to overcome difficulties in modeling and setting goals with the help of created models. The basic difficulty, except for cases when the decision is made by one agent, consists in determining the goals of the team, which can not always be determined so that the task can be reduced to the optimization of the objective function as the result of scalarisation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Multilateral Hierarchical Dynamic Decisions

Szajowski

2018

Static &Amp; Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations &Amp; Applications

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many decision problems in economics, information technology and industry can be transformed to an optimal stopping of adapted random vectors with some utility function over the set of Markov times with respect to filtration build by the decision maker's knowledge. The optimal stopping problem formulation is to find a stopping time which maximizes the expected value of the accepted (stopped) random vector's utility.There are natural extensions of optimal stopping problem to stopping gamesthe problem of stopping random vectors by two or more decision makers. Various approaches dependent on the information scheme and the aims of the agents in a considered model. This report unifies a group of non-cooperative stopping game models with forced cooperation by the role of the agents, their aims and aspirations (v. Assaf and Samuel-Cahn(1998), Szajowski and Yasuda(1997)) or extensions of the strategy sets (v. Ramsey and Szajowski (2008)).

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Multilateral Hierarchical Dynamic Decisions

Szajowski

2018

Static &Amp; Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations &Amp; Applications

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Sequential Correlated Equilibria in Stopping Games

Heller

2012

Operations Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In many situations, such as trade in stock exchanges, agents have many opportunities to act within a short interval of time. The agents in such situations can often coordinate their actions in advance, but coordination during the game consumes too much time. An equilibrium in such situations has to be sequential in order to handle mistakes made by players. In this paper, we present a new solution concept for infinite-horizon dynamic games, which is appropriate for such situations: a sequential normal-form correlated approximate equilibrium. Under additional assumptions, we show that every such game admits this kind of equilibrium.

show abstract

Cooperative Strategies in Stopping Games

Cited by 2 publications

References 12 publications

On Multilateral Hierarchical Dynamic Decisions

On Multilateral Hierarchical Dynamic Decisions

Sequential Correlated Equilibria in Stopping Games

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About