Coopting Workers under Dictatorship

Kim, Wonik; Gandhi, Jennifer

doi:10.1017/s0022381610000071

Cited by 72 publications

(62 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…The resilience of nondemocratic forms of government has renewed interest in how different kinds of nondemocracies function (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010). Much of this literature looks at institutions such as legislatures (Gandhi 2008; Kim and Gandhi 2010), or at political parties (Smith 2005) and hierarchical labor unions (Robertson 2007) that help authoritarians manage politics. Here we demonstrate the importance of two mechanisms, political competition and association rights, that are clearly likely to affect how formal institutions like legislatures and organizations like unions function and so may well underlie some of the existing findings.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Foreign Direct Investment, Regime Type, and Labor Protest in Developing Countries

Robertson

Teitelbaum

2011

American Journal of Political Science

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We explore the relationship between FDI, regime type, and strikes in low-and middle-income countries. We argue that FDI produces social tensions and opportunities for protest that can result in higher levels of industrial conflict. However, the effect of FDI is moderated by regime type. While democracies tend to have higher levels of protest overall, they are better able than authoritarian regimes to cope with the strains arising from FDI. We cite two reasons. First, political competition forces regimes to incorporate workers, which shifts conflict from industrial relations to the political arena. Second, democracies provide workers with freedom of association rights, which facilitate institutionalized grievance resolution. We test the argument using a new dataset of labor protest in low-and middle-income countries for the period 1980-2005.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Foreign Direct Investment, Regime Type, and Labor Protest in Developing Countries

Robertson

Teitelbaum

2011

American Journal of Political Science

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“…For example, in a study of the distributional policy of authoritarian regimes, Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) find that those that had limited multiparty legislatures were more likely to make policy concessions to various social groups because these institutions provide a convenient forum for making bargains. Likewise, Kim and Gandhi (2010) argue that more institutionalized autocratic regimes are better able to maintain labor peace by incorporating the interests of workers into the governing process.…”

Section: Authoritarian Regime Variationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This relationship should hold, we argue, for two distinct reasons. First, more institutionalized autocracies will tend to incorporate more dissenting voices into the governing process, increasing the size of their “selectorates” (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Kim and Gandhi 2010). Leaders who must satisfy a large number of constituents in order to stay in power will find it difficult to pay off all relevant political actors through protectionist policies.…”

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confidence: 99%

Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes: Authoritarian Variation and the Political Economy of Trade¹

Hankla

Kuthy

2012

Int Stud Q

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Over the last few decades, a vast literature has emerged examining the relationship between democratic political institutions and trade policy outcomes. While this literature has added significantly to our knowledge, it has effectively ignored policymaking in dozens of important states-those that remain autocratic. This paper fills that hole by exploring the effects of authoritarian variation on national trade policies. Our contention is that more institutionalized authoritarian regimes will tend to adopt more open trade policies. This relationship should hold, we argue, for two distinct reasons. First, we argue that autocratic regimes with larger ''selectorates'' should have greater incentives to provide public rather than private goods. As a result, we expect that multiparty, and to a lesser extent single-party, autocracies will tend to prefer more open trade policies than non-party (often personalistic) dictatorships, monarchies, and military juntas. Second, we contend that more stable autocratic regimes will have longer time horizons and therefore greater incentives to adopt policies, such as trade openness, that may strengthen long-run economic performance. We find strong support for these arguments using several cross-national time-series models of all autocracies ranging from 1962 to 2007 (contingent on data availability).Over the last few decades, a vast literature has emerged examining the relationship between democratic political institutions and trade policy outcomes. While this literature has added significantly to our knowledge of the politics of commercial openness, it has effectively ignored policymaking in dozens of important states-those that remain autocratic. Despite the recent waves of democratization, it is apparent that authoritarian regimes will not become relics in the near future, so it remains important to improve our understanding of their economic behavior. This paper seeks to do that by drawing on recent scholarship in comparative politics to explore the effects of authoritarian variation on national trade policies.For the purposes of this study, we define authoritarian regimes as those in which the primary decision makers cannot be removed from power by democratic means. Scholars of comparative political institutions have divided authoritarian regimes into a variety of subcategories, including military juntas, personalistic dictatorships, monarchies, single-party regimes, and multiparty authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999;Hadenius and Teorell 2007). Our contention is that the more institutionalized types of authoritarian regimes will tend to adopt more open trade policies. This relationship should hold, we argue, for two distinct reasons. First, more institutionalized autocracies will tend to incorporate more dissenting voices into the governing process, increasing the size of their ''selectorates'' (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Kim and Gandhi 2010). Leaders who must satisfy a large number of constituents in order to stay in power will find it difficult to pay ...

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“…For example, in authoritarian regimes with high levels of citizen participation, workers' rights remain severely restricted with an average score of less than 1 (0.8) on the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset's workers' rights scale of 0 (severely restricted) to 2 (fully protected). Further, Kim and Gandhi (2010) find that institutionalized authoritarian regimes co-opt labor in exchange for peaceful relations. Thus, disruptions to businesses due to strikes and protests will be minimal in many authoritarian regimes that allow forums for citizen organization and deliberation.…”

Section: Argument: Citizen Participation As a Constraint On Authoritamentioning

confidence: 96%

The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Authoritarian Regimes

Bastiaens

2015

International Interactions

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iv Existing scholarship does not account for why foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have been increasing to many authoritarian countries in recent decades, with some authoritarian developing countries attracting levels of FDI similar to those in democratic developing countries. This dissertation argues that while authoritarian countries are in general more risky than democratic countries, this risk can be minimized when authoritarian regimes are constrained from both "above" and "below." Authoritarian regimes that sign international investment treaties signal FDI-friendly policies and are constrained from backtracking on those policies. At the same time, authoritarian regimes that allow some degree of citizen participation in policymaking are constrained from deviating from FDI-friendly policies, which are generally preferred by citizens. In sum, it is hypothesized that authoritarian regimes that sign international investment treaties and maintain relatively high levels of citizen participation will attract the most FDI inflows. This hypothesis is tested using micro and macro level empirical evidence. Specifically, multilevel ordered probits of survey data on citizen preferences for FDI and statistical regressions of panel data on global FDI inflows are conducted. Estimation results confirm both the theoretical foundations and formal hypothesis of this dissertation: citizens in authoritarian countries view FDI inflows as welfare-enhancing and authoritarian countries with bilateral investment treaties and high levels of citizen participation attract the most FDI inflows. Additionally, results from an original survey of U.S. foreign investors reveal that multinational companies are aware of and value international investment treaties and freedom of association in host nations, thereby providing key primary evidence in support of the hypothesis. Finally, a comparative case study of Jordan and Syria further illustrate the micro-foundations of the argument. While both Jordan and Syria have signaled a dedication to liberal economic policies, Jordan has been the successor in attracting FDI inflows because of its participatory decision-making processes. This dissertation contributes to international political economy, international organization, and authoritarian political institution research by illuminating the domestic factors that provide credibility of compliance to international treaties signed by authoritarian countries. Previous literature has failed to address the variation of foreign investment inflows to authoritarian regimes and the role of compliance to international investment treaties in attracting these investment inflows to authoritarian countries.

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Coopting Workers under Dictatorship

Cited by 72 publications

References 37 publications

Foreign Direct Investment, Regime Type, and Labor Protest in Developing Countries

Foreign Direct Investment, Regime Type, and Labor Protest in Developing Countries

Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes: Authoritarian Variation and the Political Economy of Trade¹

The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Authoritarian Regimes

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Coopting Workers under Dictatorship

Cited by 72 publications

References 37 publications

Foreign Direct Investment, Regime Type, and Labor Protest in Developing Countries

Foreign Direct Investment, Regime Type, and Labor Protest in Developing Countries

Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes: Authoritarian Variation and the Political Economy of Trade1

The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Authoritarian Regimes

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Product

Resources

About

Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes: Authoritarian Variation and the Political Economy of Trade¹