2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2013.06.001
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Coordinated strategic defaults and financial fragility in a costly state verification model

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Cited by 16 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…Following from the proof of Proposition , we do not consider mixed strategies. The existence of a default cut‐off value in our model is similar to the results of Proposition in Carrasco and Salgado ().…”
supporting
confidence: 88%
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“…Following from the proof of Proposition , we do not consider mixed strategies. The existence of a default cut‐off value in our model is similar to the results of Proposition in Carrasco and Salgado ().…”
supporting
confidence: 88%
“…Wang et al . (), Brown, Ciochetti and Riddiough () and Carrasco and Salgado () develop models in which borrower default depends on the lender's foreclosure and renegotiation policy. Borrower default is endogenous and the models address the ex post efficiency of renegotiation and foreclosure decisions.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Following Carrasco and Salgado (2014), the level of liquidity determines the capacity to enforce loan repayment. However, I…”
Section: 2related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such claim would be a natural conjecture if, as in Carrasco and Salgado (2014), the level of liquidity determines the capacity to enforce loan repayment. If the originating bank can sell the loan to a bank with surplus liquidity, then a borrower run is an irrelevant possibility.…”
Section: 2related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%