Coordinating a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Carbon Tax

Yu, Wei Ping; Han, Ruizhu

doi:10.3390/su9122360

Cited by 30 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 27 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Chen and Hao [15] studied the impacts of carbon tax policy on the sustainable pricing and production policies of two competing firms and showed that a firm obtains a larger carbon emissions reduction percentage if they undertake a higher carbon tax. Yu and Han [16] investigated the impacts of carbon tax policy on product retail price and total carbon emission in a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer and designed two contracts to coordinate the supply chain. Wang et al [17] studied the optimal production decisions of new and remanufactured products under carbon tax policy and found that manufacturers can offset the cannibalization and curb carbon emissions via adopting low-carbon emission technology.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Optimal Carbon Reduction and Return Strategies under Carbon Tax Policy

Wang

Huang

2018

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recently, consumers have been increasingly shopping due to the development of e-commerce; thus, many traditional firms producing green products are entering e-commerce platforms to sell products for their survival. In the contexts of online sales and carbon tax policy, firms need to determine an optimal carbon reduction level and online return strategies. To address firms' decision-making challenges, we consider a firm producing and selling its green products via an e-commerce platform. For optimal online return strategies, we find that if the residual value of the returned product is relatively small, the firm should not offer an online return service; otherwise, the firm should offer this service. Moreover, the results show that carbon tax policy is detrimental to the firm and consumers, while increasing the average customer satisfaction rate of the product benefits the firm and consumers. Interestingly, we find that the platform should reduce its referral fee as the unit carbon tax increases.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Optimal Carbon Reduction and Return Strategies under Carbon Tax Policy

Wang

Huang

2018

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Similarly, the Chinese government has provided financial support to encourage consumers to buy new low-energy vehicles since 2015, and has also encouraged firms to offer green products [8]. Second, internal funds (e.g., greening cost-sharing between the members of a supply chain) is another method that can help firms to switch to the manufacture of green products [9][10][11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

External Intervention or Internal Coordination? Incentives to Promote Sustainable Development through Green Supply Chains

Tong¹,

Li²

2018

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To encourage firms to engage in green production, two different types of investment funding, namely external funds from agencies outside the supply chain (e.g., government subsidy), and internal funds from supply chain partners (e.g., greening cost-sharing with the retailer), are investigated in this paper. Based on game theory, the decision-making behavior and profits of a competitive supply chain consisting of a green manufacturer, a regular manufacturer, and a retailer are analyzed under both funding schemes. The results show that while both government subsidy and greening cost-sharing contract can achieve the goals of increasing a product’s degree of greenness and increasing the sales of green products, there are differences between these two methods in reaching these goals. Further, both via theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that although both the green manufacturer and the retailer can greatly benefit from government subsidy and greening cost-sharing contract, they may have different preferences regarding these two methods, which are mainly related to the size of the government subsidy, the fraction of greening cost-sharing with the retailer, the Research and Development (R&D) cost coefficient, the greenness sensitivity coefficient, and price sensitivity coefficient. Finally, the supply chain members’ behaviors (including the production and pricing decisions and, the choice of funds investment) are largely affected by the government subsidy mechanism.

show abstract

“…This paper referred to the environmental impact of enterprises in the process of the production and circulation of products [48]. Similar to the research on measuring environmental benefits through total carbon emissions [49][50][51][52], this study assumed that the utility function of an environmental benefits objective is the product of the greening level and market demand, which is:…”

Section: Model Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Multi-Objective Optimization Model for Green Supply Chain Considering Environmental Benefits

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Whether the upstream and downstream members in a supply chain (considering environmental objectives) simultaneously stabilize economic benefits has become an important problem in the process of green development. However, few quantitative studies on green supply chains have considered environmental and economic benefits to realize multi-objective optimization. To study operation and cooperation strategies with a consideration of the different objective on the level of supply chain, we first establish a green supply chain game model with profit and environment objectives simultaneously considered by the manufacturer. Then, we analyze the multi-objective decisions of the supply chain members under centralized control using a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and revenue-sharing contract. Using the manufacturer's environmental preference as a variable, the effects of environmental benefits on the supply chain are also investigated. Finally, this study determines that the manufacturer's profit will be reduced after considering the objective of environmental benefits, while the retailer's profit, product greenness, and environmental benefits will be improved. Meanwhile, the total profit of the green supply chain will first increase and then decrease. In particular, a revenue-sharing contract can facilitate the coordination of multiple objectives; in this way, both the manufacturer and the retailer achieve higher profits and environmental benefits compared to a decentralized control condition, which is of great significance in achieving a win-win situation for the economy and the environment.

show abstract

Coordinating a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Carbon Tax

Cited by 30 publications

References 27 publications

The Optimal Carbon Reduction and Return Strategies under Carbon Tax Policy

The Optimal Carbon Reduction and Return Strategies under Carbon Tax Policy

External Intervention or Internal Coordination? Incentives to Promote Sustainable Development through Green Supply Chains

A Multi-Objective Optimization Model for Green Supply Chain Considering Environmental Benefits

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About