Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dual-Source Supply and Low-Carbon Concern

Li, Jing; Gong, Shuying

doi:10.1155/2020/7506791

Cited by 11 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 37 publications

(39 reference statements)

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“…Li and Gong considered the impact of dual-source supply and low-carbon manufacturing on the closed-loop supply chain system, constructed a two-stage CLSC model led by suppliers, and coordinated the supply chain through cost-sharing contracts. The results show that the cost-sharing contract is applicable and effective for both economic and environmental development [24]. It can be seen that in the green and low supply chain, enterprises tend to avoid the risks caused by green efforts through cost-sharing contracts, but cost-sharing contracts are rarely used to coordinate fairness concerns issues.…”

Section: Cost-sharing Contractmentioning

confidence: 97%

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making and Coordination Considering Fairness Concerns under Carbon Neutral Rewards and Punishments

et al. 2023

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The cheap price of carbon sink trading in certification emission reduction (CER) makes it more popular than the carbon emission allowance (CEA); trading in carbon-neutral, enterprises are more inclined to purchase carbon sinks to achieve their own carbon neutrality goals and promote decarbonization of the whole chain. Companies urgently need to figure out how to achieve carbon neutrality with government rewards and punishments. Moreover, as an important factor affecting the effectiveness of supply chain, it is particularly important to study how to coordinate fairness concerns of such objects. Therefore, a centralized and two-stage Stackelberg game model of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) of one manufacturer and one retailer is constructed, and the cost-sharing contract, revenue-sharing contract, and cost–revenue-sharing contract are used to coordinate it, taking into account the fairness concerns of downstream enterprises while pursuing carbon neutrality, ensuring the overall benefits of the supply chain, and considering the impact of government subsidies and rewards and punishments on the carbon neutrality of the supply chain. Research shows that (1) compared with the other two contracts, the cost–revenue-sharing contract performs better and can effectively achieve the Pareto optimum; (2) the cost-sharing contract performs better in accomplishing the carbon neutrality of the CLSC; (3) excessively high carbon sink prices are not only detrimental to enterprise efficiency, but also to the realization of carbon neutrality goal; and (4) higher supply chain utility is pursued by enterprises when the unit reward and punishment are not great enough; otherwise, carbon neutrality is pursued. The research results can not only provide decision support for the product pricing, carbon sink reserve and contract design of CLSC enterprises under the goal of carbon neutrality, but can also provide a reference for the setting of government subsidies and rewards and punishment.

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Section: Cost-sharing Contractmentioning

confidence: 97%

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making and Coordination Considering Fairness Concerns under Carbon Neutral Rewards and Punishments

et al. 2023

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“…Wang et al (2020a, 2020b, 2020c) analysed the influence of a government subsidy and a remanufacturer’s altruistic preference on the decision-making for a low-carbon e-commerce closed-loop supply chain. Li and Gong (2020) built a low-carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and two suppliers to study how greenness affects supply chain participants’ decisions. Liu and Li (2020) set up a differential game model for a two-level supply chain.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of corporate social responsibility on carbon emission reduction in supply chains

Zhou

Zhu

Zhang

2023

CMS

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Purpose This paper aims to introduce corporate social responsibility into the green supply chain and analyse the impact of different decision makers’ decision-making schemes on carbon emission reduction in the supply chain. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a two-stage low-carbon supply chain composed of a manufacturer and retailer as the research object. It uses the Stackelberg game model to analyse optimal carbon emission reduction and its influence under different decision-making modes. Findings Increased consumer green preferences and trust can improve the manufacturing enterprises’ carbon emission reduction rate. The carbon emission reduction rate decreases with increased green innovation costs. When green technology innovation costs remain constant, the greater the market capacity, the higher the carbon emission reduction rate. Market capacity has the most significant impact on the optimal carbon emission reduction rate without considering social responsibility decisions and has the least impact on the optimal carbon emission reduction rate while fully considering the social responsibility decision. To achieve decarbonisation production, the market capacity must be small, and when green innovation costs are high, it is the optimal choice without considering social responsibility. To achieve a higher level of carbon emission reduction, when the market capacity is low and the research and development cost is high or when the market capacity is large, it is the optimal choice. Originality/value The results provide scientific policy decisions and management significance for governments and enterprises in low-carbon subsidies and supply chain management. The findings also provide a basis for future theoretical research and enterprise practice.

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“…Konishi believed that only when the purchaser cannot obtain diversified benefits through other channels and the supplier's supply capacity is greater than the demand for market products, single-source procurement will be the manufacturer's optimal procurement strategy; otherwise, dual-source procurement will be the best optimal procurement strategy [16]. Ji and Gong constructed a CLSC model with two competitive dominant upstream suppliers and one following a downstream (re-)manufacturer and then coordinated supply chain through a cost-sharing contract [17]. Liu et al compared the supply chain coordination issues when supplier groups and buyers adopt revenue sharing + secondpenalty contracts and option contracts [18].…”

Section: Supply Chain Coordination Of Different Procurementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dual-Source Procurement and Supplier Pricing Decision under Supply Interruption

Cheng

Zhang

Chen

et al. 2021

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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The occurrence of major public health events usually leads to interruptions in the supply chain. This article studies the supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one manufacturer. In the case of supply interruptions, the manufacturer adopts two models of unit cost subsidies and proportional subsidies. The reliability of the supplier’s supply is incentivized and ensured. A Stackelberg game model is established in which the manufacturer is the leader and the supplier is the follower. The research results show that the optimal order quantity of the supplier manufacturer and the optimal wholesale price of the supplier will be affected by the reliability level, and the optimal supply chain profits of the two models under different parameters are compared.

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Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dual-Source Supply and Low-Carbon Concern

Cited by 11 publications

References 37 publications

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making and Coordination Considering Fairness Concerns under Carbon Neutral Rewards and Punishments

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making and Coordination Considering Fairness Concerns under Carbon Neutral Rewards and Punishments

Impact of corporate social responsibility on carbon emission reduction in supply chains

Dual-Source Procurement and Supplier Pricing Decision under Supply Interruption

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