Coordination, timing and common knowledge

Morris, Stephen

doi:10.1016/j.rie.2014.04.004

Cited by 17 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Among the alternative ways to understand agents' behavior in settings with strategic complementarities, the so-called global games literature is a particularly popular one (see Carlsson & Damme, 1993;Morris &Shin, 1998, andMorris &Shin, 2003). The basic global-game models are static coordination games where agents observe a noisy idiosyncratic signal on a fundamental variable that affects payoffs (θ).…”

Section: Relation To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This dynamic framework seems different from global games because all information is common knowledge. Morris (2014) shows that this intuition is misleading: what matters is not players' actual beliefs but what their beliefs were at their last opportunity to switch actions. Now consider that an event is effectively known by a player if she knew it the last time she had an opportunity to change behavior.…”

Section: Relation To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: Theory and applications

Guimarães¹,

Machado

Pereira

2020

J Public Economic Theory

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We present a general framework of dynamic coordination with timing frictions. A continuum of agents receive random chances to choose between two actions and remain locked in the selected action until their next opportunity to reoptimize. The instantaneous utility from each action depends on an exogenous fundamental that moves stochastically and on the mass of agents currently playing each action. Agents' decisions are strategic complements and history matters. We review some key theoretical results and show a general method to solve the social planner's problem. We then review applications of this framework to different economic problems: network externalities, statistical discrimination, and business cycles. The positive implications of these models are very similar, but the social planner's solution points to very different results for efficiency in each case. Last, we review extensions of the framework that allow for endogenous hazard rates and ex ante heterogeneous agents.

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Section: Relation To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Relation To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: Theory and applications

Guimarães¹,

Machado

Pereira

2020

J Public Economic Theory

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show abstract

“…The work of Stephen Morris is particularly notable when surveying the literature related to common knowledge and common belief. Morris, often following the work of Monderer and Samet, has done much theoretical work relating to common knowledge and common belief [15,[17][18][19]. More recently, he has also collaborated with Benjamin Golub to study higherorder reasoning, reminiscent the infinite hierarchy of reasoning in the initial definitions of common knowledge and common belief, in network settings [10,11].…”

Section: Additional Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Relaxing Common Belief for Social Networks

Burrell¹,

Schoenebeck²

2020

Preprint

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We propose a relaxation of common belief called factional belief that is suitable for the analysis of strategic coordination on social networks. We show how this definition can be used to analyze revolt games on general graphs, including by giving an efficient algorithm that characterizes a structural result about the possible equilibria of such games.This extends prior work on common knowledge and common belief, which has been too restrictive for use in understanding strategic coordination and cooperation in social network settings.

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“…Their second-order beliefs are about other DMs' first-order beliefs, how their decisions are a by-product of their uncertainty about the details of what their partners will do, and so on. Uncertainty arises when DMs don't have knowledge about each other's beliefs (Morris 2014). In settings that require coordination, complex uncertainty influences their behavior.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Speculation: Forms and Functions

Hovorka,

Mueller

2024

Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences

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Inefficiencies and coordination failures in firm decisionmaking may be caused by the lack of common or shared information. As complex uncertainty is a driver of such failures, research is needed to delineate the roles of technology, digitalization, and cross-firm information integration to address the problem within and beyond firm boundaries. Relational contracts within firm boundaries are pervasive, so maintaining shared information among decision-makers is hard. Thus, increased digitalization to reduce uncertainty is relevant for decision-making. Since interorganizational systems can promote interfirm governance and information commonality, connecting digitalization and firm transaction costs has become more important. Because the effects of uncertainty reduction depend on IS capabilities and effective cross-firm information integration, our study offers new insights into performance differences for linked firms. To illustrate, we analyze cases with complex uncertainty theory.

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Coordination, timing and common knowledge

Cited by 17 publications

References 47 publications

Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: Theory and applications

Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: Theory and applications

Relaxing Common Belief for Social Networks

Speculation: Forms and Functions

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