2017
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x
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Coordination with communication under oath

Abstract: Herein we explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment via a truth-telling oath can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic sequential coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap-talk communication.Three results emerge with commitment-via-the-oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increase… Show more

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Cited by 32 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…Pledges, oaths, and commitments are an integral part of our society and are required by many professions, including medical doctors and elected government officials. Recent experimental research finds that oath-taking can improve coordination and lead to more efficient outcomes in strategic environments (Jacquemet et al 2018). These findings have implications for the provision of environmental goods, which often requires coordination among numerous individuals.…”
Section: Commitmentmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Pledges, oaths, and commitments are an integral part of our society and are required by many professions, including medical doctors and elected government officials. Recent experimental research finds that oath-taking can improve coordination and lead to more efficient outcomes in strategic environments (Jacquemet et al 2018). These findings have implications for the provision of environmental goods, which often requires coordination among numerous individuals.…”
Section: Commitmentmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…One can do power calculations for other variables with large but insignificant coefficients in an analogous manner." Jacquemet et al (2018) lab "Conventional power calculation (based on a standard one-sided proportion test supporting the significance of the effect of the oath on the truth-telling ratio, with α = 5%) for the data reported in Fig. 4b yields the power of 0.357.…”
Section: Type Of Experiments Evidencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…[…] for the data reported in Fig. 4b yields the power of 0.357" (Jacquemet et al 2018) or "A sample size analysis indicates that 1411, 965 and 38407 observations would be needed to obtain a significant result for […]." (Dreber et al 2011).…”
Section: Evidence Of Sample Size and Power Calculationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, an observer reports that, among the !Kung, a hunter suspected of not having fully participated in the hunt would swear "by the great captain nu χu, and all [would] believe him" (Lebzelter, 1934, p. 109). Experimental results show that U.S. and French participants take promises (which can be considered as a weak form of oath), as well as oaths seriously when playing trust games or similar economic games, even in the absence of possibility to punish liars (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006;Jacquemet, Luchini, Shogren, & Zylbersztejn, 2018; see also Balliet, 2010;Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992).…”
Section: Oaths As Noise-proof Commitment Devicesmentioning
confidence: 99%