Coproduction and the crafting of cognitive institutions during the COVID-19 pandemic

Rayamajhee, Veeshan; Paniagua, Pablo

doi:10.1017/s1744137422000078

Cited by 12 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…However, this process is in its early stages and needs to be more assertive. Recent empirical literature related to the COVID-19 pandemic highlights that co-production is essential to the design of cognitive institutions as it acknowledges the central role of citizens in polycentric governance, whether they advance or undermine its goals (Frolov, 2022; Rayamajhee and Paniagua, 2022). In our empirical investigation, citizens are catalysts for institutional arrangements.…”

Section: Discussion: Public Policy-making In the Light Of The Reconfi...mentioning

confidence: 99%

To what extent do institutional arrangements shape the excludability of resource systems? Lessons from French farms

Kassis

2023

Journal of Institutional Economics

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The question of the impact of institutional arrangements on the nature of goods is insufficiently addressed in the literature. By the nature of goods, we refer to the economic taxonomy of goods, meaning their privateness is defined according to their degrees of excludability and subtractability. This paper aims to fill this research gap by examining whether institutional arrangements developed for the management of private goods can reduce the degrees of excludability of these goods. To this end, we analyse four collective farmland management projects in the Isère department in France. We adapt the tool of property as a bundle of rights in order to characterize the impact of these projects on the nature of farmland. Our results show that the distribution of land rights, as well as the rules designed to define land rights, influence the degree of excludability of farmland. We discuss the impact of these findings on public policy-making.

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Section: Discussion: Public Policy-making In the Light Of The Reconfi...mentioning

confidence: 99%

To what extent do institutional arrangements shape the excludability of resource systems? Lessons from French farms

Kassis

2023

Journal of Institutional Economics

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“…12 For more on the "packageability" of public goods and services, see Rayamajhee and Paniagua [2021], especially section 3.3.…”

Section: Diagnostics: Steelmanning Coextensivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two (lay) dogmas on externalities

Baltzly

2024

Public Choice

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I argue that much current thinking on externalities-at least among "lay political economists" (but even, on occasion, among professional economists)-is saddled with two analytical errors. The first is what I call coextensivism: the conflation of public goods and externalities. The second error is what I call externality profligacy: the conflation of economic and "social" externalities. The principal dangers presented by these two "dogmas on externalities" are that, while in their grips, we are under-disposed to seek negotiated, market-based solutions (of a broadly Coasean nature) to challenges posed by economic externalities, and overdisposed to seek coercive, state-based solutions (of a broadly Pigouvian nature) to challenges posed by social externalities.

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“…An important implication of the above analysis is that commons governance requires inputs and "buy-in" from participants [25]. This holds true not only for common pool resource management, but also for the governance of global environmental externalities, climatic disasters, and pandemics [26][27][28]. Thus, although a narrow set of externalities may require some centralization, it comes at a steep cost of an increased probability of reducing citizen input [29].…”

Section: The Tragedy Of Nurdles?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Tragedy of the Nurdles: Governing Global Externalities

2023

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Nurdles have been referred to by some as a global environmental disaster. However, relative to the controversies surrounding industrial fracking practices, such as public health and safety associated with extraction of shale gas (as well as shale oil), the problems with nurdles are not as widely known. In this article, we highlight that fracking and nurdles are interrelated: fracking processes are a major source of the raw materials used to produce nurdles, which are tiny plastic pellets polluting our waters. Our contention is that a key question for analysis of fracking is how to regulate the externalities associated with downstream products produced in the fracking process. This article takes insights from Elinor Ostrom and scholars of the Bloomington School of Political Economy—such as polycentricity, diversity of collective action problems (CAPs), coproduction, and institutional diversity—to analyze nurdles pollution as a global commons problem. Nurdles generate widespread, large-scale negative externalities that are difficult to contain and address within a fixed geographical boundary governed by a static jurisdictional authority. Using the case of the Royal Dutch Shell cracker plant in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, we show that nurdles present complex and nested challenges that require coproduction, with citizen monitoring playing an essential role in mitigating negative externalities. We demonstrate the efficacy of applying polycentric approaches toward addressing CAPs associated with nurdles.

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Coproduction and the crafting of cognitive institutions during the COVID-19 pandemic

Cited by 12 publications

References 16 publications

To what extent do institutional arrangements shape the excludability of resource systems? Lessons from French farms

To what extent do institutional arrangements shape the excludability of resource systems? Lessons from French farms

Two (lay) dogmas on externalities

The Tragedy of the Nurdles: Governing Global Externalities

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