2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2001033
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Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions

Abstract: In a stylized environment with complementary products, we study a class of dominant strategy implementable direct mechanisms and focus on the objective of minimizing the expected surplus from core deviations. For this class of mechanisms, we formulate the core deviation minimization problem as a calculus of variations problem and numerically solve it for some interesting special cases. We then compare the core deviation surplus in the optimal auction (CDMA) to that in Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism (VCG) and c… Show more

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“…For example, Roth (1982) notes that stable and efficient solutions are often different outcomes for matching markets, while the more recent work of Che and Tercieux (2019) shows asymptotic stability and efficiency as markets get large. Similarly, the trade‐off between stability and efficiency has been explored in the context of auctions, for example by Hafalir and Yekta (2015).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, Roth (1982) notes that stable and efficient solutions are often different outcomes for matching markets, while the more recent work of Che and Tercieux (2019) shows asymptotic stability and efficiency as markets get large. Similarly, the trade‐off between stability and efficiency has been explored in the context of auctions, for example by Hafalir and Yekta (2015).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%