Core Executives and Coordination of Eu Law Transposition: Evidence From New Member States

Abstract

This article compares cabinet institutions for coordinating the transposition of EU legislation in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. It examines how national executives have adapted to European integration and what factors have shaped institutional variation across countries and over time. During pre-accession, the Hungarian, Polish and (to a lesser extent) Czech cabinets established strong core executives for tracking EU-related legislative commitments, monitoring progress and reviewing the quality of transposition. After accession, the cores in all three cabinets loosened the grip on transposition, although to different degrees. The analysis shows that, if sectoral factors are kept constant, variation in the patterns of national adaptation can be explained with reference to external incentives and constitutional rules. High benefits of transposition before accession encouraged centralization, particularly in prime-ministerial cabinets. Fewer incentives under full membership contributed to a halt or reversal in core executive ascendancy, especially in ministerial-type cabinets.

Core Executive Studies Two Decades On

“…For example, Zubek (2001, p. 912) cites Rhodes' definition of the core executive and shows that in Poland the core executive's ‘capacity to shape policy remains checked by significant systemic, political and organizational constraints'. Equally, in his comparative work (Zubek 2010) demonstrates that core executive capacity varies from one country to another as a function of many factors ranging from broad constitutional rules to more contingent and transient external and domestic conditions. When discussing the core executive in this way, the literature is closely related to the second phase of Rhodes' work, namely the way in which the development of the core executive affects patterns of governance as a whole.…”

Organizing for Eu Implementation: The Europeanization of Government Ministries in Estonia, Poland, and Slovenia

“…For example, Dimitrova and Toshkov (2007) have explicitly examined the relevance of institutional lock‐in for post‐accession institutionalization of executive coordination and have found little support for it. Similarly, Zubek (2011) shows how special core executive arrangements created before membership were dismantled soon after accession. Finally, Meyer‐Sahling (2011) finds much change in civil service policies following full membership.…”

The Emperor Has No Clothes! Power and Resources within the Greek Core Executive

“…This is not to deny change can and does occur within a solitary center. In their studies of EU transposition processes, for example, Zubek (2011) portrays a contingency in Central Europe and Dimitrakopoulos (2011) a case of EU intervention supporting innovators within the Greek bureaucracy on public procurement.…”