Core, shapley value, nucleolus and nash bargaining solution: A Survey of recent developments and applications in operations management

Luo, Chunlin; Zhou, Xiaoyang; Lev, Benjamin

doi:10.1016/j.omega.2022.102638

Cited by 39 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 89 publications

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“…If the core is not empty, the nucleolus should lie in the core as well, guaranteeing the grand coalition's stability [17]. However, obtaining the nucleolus might not be simple because of numerical issues [18]. Additionally, none of the monotonicity requirements are guaranteed [18].…”

Section: B Nucleolusmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coalitional Game Theory in Power Systems: Applications, Challenges, and Future Directions

Gautam¹,

Benidris²

2023

Preprint

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Game theory-based approaches have recently gained traction in a wide range of applications, importantly in power and energy systems. With the onset of cooperation as a new perspective for solving power system problems, as well as the nature of power system problems, it is now necessary to seek appropriate game theory-based tools that permit the investigation and analysis of the behavior and relationships of various players in power system problems. In this context, this paper performs a literature review on coalitional game theory's most recent advancements and applications in power and energy systems. First, we provide a brief overview of the coalitional game theory's fundamental ideas, current theoretical advancements, and various solution concepts. Second, we examine the recent applications in power and energy systems. Finally, we explore the challenges, limitations, and future research possibilities with applications in power and energy systems in the hopes of furthering the literature by strengthening the applications of coalitional game theory in power and energy systems.

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Section: B Nucleolusmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, obtaining the nucleolus might not be simple because of numerical issues [18]. Additionally, none of the monotonicity requirements are guaranteed [18]. Moreover, the payoff distribution based on the concept of the nucleolus can be unstable if the core doesn't exist.…”

Section: B Nucleolusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalitional Game Theory in Power Systems: Applications, Challenges, and Future Directions

Gautam¹,

Benidris²

2023

Preprint

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“…Unlike competing with others [ 39 ], agents in cooperative games aim to solve a common task or maximizing the overall payoff to collaborate with each other. Therefore, from this perspective, the MCA problem can also be considered a profit-sharing problem in cooperative games [ 40 ], for which various methods such as the Shapley method [ 41 ], the core [ 42 , 43 ], Nash bargaining [ 43 ], and bankruptcy [ 44 , 45 ] have been suggested for. One of the methods used to allocate resources when they are limited and there are many applicants is the bankruptcy method [ 45 ]; this happens when the available resources are less than what is requested by the applicants.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Agent Credit Assignment and Bankruptcy Game for Improving Resource Allocation in Smart Cities

Yarahmadi

Shiri

Challenger

et al. 2023

Sensors

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In recent years, the development of smart cities has accelerated. There are several issues to handle in smart cities, one of the most important of which is efficient resource allocation. For the modeling of smart cities, multi-agent systems (MASs) can be used. In this paper, an efficient approach is proposed for resource allocation in smart cities based on the multi-agent credit assignment problem (MCA) and bankruptcy game. To this end, the resource allocation problem is mapped to MCA and the bankruptcy game. To solve this problem, first, a task start threshold (TST) constraint is introduced. The MCA turns into a bankruptcy problem upon introducing such a constraint. Therefore, based on the concept of bankruptcy, three methods of TS-Only, TS + MAS, and TS + ExAg are presented to solve the MCA. In addition, this work introduces a multi-score problem (MSP) in which a different reward is offered for solving each part of the problem, and we used it in our experiments to examine the proposed methods. The proposed approach is evaluated based on the learning rate, confidence, expertness, efficiency, certainty, and correctness parameters. The results reveal the better performance of the proposed approach compared to the existing methods in five parameters.

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“…Te retailer's bargaining power is α, and the manufacturer's bargaining power is 1 − α. We consider the Nash bargaining solution, which is often used when two players decide how to share the surplus [37,38]. Many studies [39][40][41] apply the Nash bargaining solution to analyze the game and decisionmaking between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain.…”

Section: Model Description and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blockchain-Driven Supply Chain’s Financing and Coordination Strategy under Nash Bargaining Scheme

Tang

2023

Complexity

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Blockchain-driven supply chain finance (SCF) has become an emerging supply chain financing mode. Compared with the traditional SCF mode, blockchain-driven SCF can shorten the transaction process and provide real trade data that cannot be tampered with, thereby improving the efficiency of capital operation. This article explores the financing and coordination problems of a blockchain-driven supply chain. Based on the three most common supply chain contracts (revenue-sharing contract, profit-sharing contract, and two-part tariff contract), we construct a comparative model of bank credit financing (BCF) and blockchain-driven SCF, discuss the optimal decision-making strategy of the supply chain, and quantitatively analyze the performance of supply chain under each mode. The results show the following: (i) there is a threshold for the usage rate of the blockchain-driven SCF platform; (ii) only when the platform usage rate is lower than the threshold, the blockchain-driven SCF mode which benefits both manufacturer and retailer is a better choice; (iii) the above results always hold if supply chain contracts can coordinate the supply chain in terms of quantity decisions; (iv) the blockchain-driven SCF mode is more efficient for supply chains which are less capital-constrained. This article provides a decision basis for the selection of supply chain financing channels and provides an idea for future research on blockchain-driven SCF.

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Core, shapley value, nucleolus and nash bargaining solution: A Survey of recent developments and applications in operations management

Cited by 39 publications

References 89 publications

Coalitional Game Theory in Power Systems: Applications, Challenges, and Future Directions

Coalitional Game Theory in Power Systems: Applications, Challenges, and Future Directions

Multi-Agent Credit Assignment and Bankruptcy Game for Improving Resource Allocation in Smart Cities

Blockchain-Driven Supply Chain’s Financing and Coordination Strategy under Nash Bargaining Scheme

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