The effectiveness of environmental standards depends critically on the ability to achieve high rates of adoption. In cases where environmental standards are mandatory, companies might decide to cease production if compliance proves to be too costly; in cases where standards are voluntary, participation in the corresponding schemes will depend, to a larger extent, on the discretion of individuals. Certain groups of individuals and companies may be unintentionally excluded from participation in schemes (and adoption of standards) because of budget constraints due to initial transaction costs, or simply through informational barriers (Pannell and Wilkinson 2009;Pascual et al. 2010). Female, older and small-scale producers may, for instance, experience such barriers that limit their participation (e.g. see Grieg-Gran et al. 2005; Karbasioun et al. 2008).While willingness to adopt environmental standards is, hence, likely to be influenced by the amount of financial rewards on offer and their opportunity costs, other socio-cultural factors might also have an important role to play. For example, there is evidence that the perceived fairness of conservation schemes (even when these are accompanied with monetary rewards) can be instrumental in increasing participation (Paloniemi and Vainio 2011, see also Korsgaard et al. 1995, for a broader discussion on the role of perceived fairness in increasing commitment to certain behavioural changes).The expected distributional impacts and their equity are intrinsically linked to the institutional set-up of environmental standards. This is in line with social psychology concepts that link fairness perceptions to both the process, as well as final outcomes (Folger and Konovsky 1989;Hunt and Haider 2001). Environmental standards are often designed with an emphasis on the attainment of certain environmental targets, with little consideration given to how certain groups (e.g. low income groups, women, indigenous people) may be disadvantaged (or proportionately less favoured) in the process.