Corporate boards and the performance of Asian firms: A meta-analysis

Abstract

The prevalence of ownership concentration in Asian firms presents a challenge to the influential agency theory-based understanding of the role of corporate boards. In this paper we develop and test hypotheses about board attributes and firm performance that reflect Asian institutional conditions. We present the first metaanalysis of the relationship between board attributes and performance of Asian firms using a varied set of meta-analytical techniques on a database of 86 studies covering nine Asian countries. First, we find that board structure and composition preferences are influenced by the identity of the concentrated owner. Second, consistent with US data, we find very limited evidence of a direct relationship between board attributes and firm financial performance in the Asian context. Third, we find that the relationship between board structure and composition and firm performance is mediated by the revealed strategic preferences of Asian firms specifically by the level of R&D investment.

Firms’ Board Independence and Corporate Social Performance: A Meta-Analysis

“…On the one hand, the independence of a firm's board has been defined as the extent to which the board of directors operates independently from executive directors [182] and it has been usually measured as the percentage of board members who are non-executive directors, outside directors and independent directors [49,50,67,183]. On the other hand, Dunn and Sainty [74] state that "the essence of CSP is the recognition or awareness that there are multiple stakeholders against which a business has responsibility towards in the longer term".…”

Relation between business satisfaction and board dimensions in joint ventures between Spanish and Moroccan SMEs

“…In this sense, the presence of independent external directors is presented as a mechanism to promote internal control (Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2005;Dahya & McConell, 2007). Following the agency theory, it is expected that the increased presence of outside directors on the Board of a JV would have a positive impact on the degree of partners' satisfaction obtained from the project (Wagner, Stimpert & Fubara, 1998;Hossain, Prevost, & Rao, 2001;Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005;Dahya & McConell, 2007;Jackling & Johl, 2009;Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011;Van Essen, Van Oosterhout & Carney, 2012). In accordance with this idea, the following hypothesis is proposed:…”

“…Participation by company directors in its ownership is considered a mechanism that can potentially reduce opportunistic behaviour (Brunninge, Nordqvist & Wiklund, 2008;Florackis, Kostakis & Ozkan, 2009;Boyd, Haynes & Zona, 2011;Van Essen et al, 2012). For Jensen (1983a &1983b), conflicts arise when the agents responsible for taking company decisions do not have a major stake in it, i.e., when their decisions do not significantly affect their own wealth.…”

Immigrants from Asia: Are they better for a More Ethical Business Environment?

“…A foreigner, who is working as a manager, always mean the probability of a conflict. But if the manager is Asian, it also means possible business relationships with some other Asian companies [16]. For example, Chinese managers tend to cooperate with Chinese managers [17].…”