2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.11.013
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Corporate governance and family business performance

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Cited by 195 publications
(192 citation statements)
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“…For Campbell et al (2011), the board of directors is an important monitoring agent, particularly in corporate events in which managers' interests are tangential to shareholders' interests. The challenge for all board members is aligning business strategy with shareholder interests, in an environment in which shareholders aim to obtain value in the long run, while top management seeks growth and increased valuation in the short run (Brenes et al, 2011).…”
Section: Board Of Director Interlockingmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…For Campbell et al (2011), the board of directors is an important monitoring agent, particularly in corporate events in which managers' interests are tangential to shareholders' interests. The challenge for all board members is aligning business strategy with shareholder interests, in an environment in which shareholders aim to obtain value in the long run, while top management seeks growth and increased valuation in the short run (Brenes et al, 2011).…”
Section: Board Of Director Interlockingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Th eir role is to ensure equal treatment of shareholders and to intermediate between shareholder interests and manager practices, which thus makes boards important monitoring agents (Brenes, Madrigal & Requena, 2011;Campbell, Ghosh, Petrova & Sirmans, 2011).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Está basado en los desarrollos empíricos que muestran una relación entre gobierno corporativo y desempeño (Anderson y Reeb, 2003;Andres, 2008;Block, Jaskiewicz & Miller, 2011;Chu, 2011). De forma general, estos estudios muestran que la mejora en el desempeño se debe a que las estructuras de gobierno están en sintonía con los requerimientos del mercado y de los accionistas, situación que proporciona objetividad a las decisiones y ayuda a mejorar la percepción de transparencia y confianza en los miembros familiares que no participan de forma activa en la gestión de la empresa (Brenes, Madrigal & Requena, 2011). No obstante, algunos estudios han identificado que las familias con control de la propiedad pueden buscar sus objetivos, aunque estos vayan en detrimento de los accionistas externos (Braun & Sharma, 2007).…”
Section: Gestión Y Organizaciónunclassified
“…Otros estudios se centran en la junta directiva y muestran que los miembros no familiares en este órgano de gobierno proporcionan objetividad adicional a las decisiones, siendo determinantes en la mayor percepción de transparencia y confianza de los miembros familiares que no participan de la gestión de la empresa (Brenes et al, 2011). Anderson y Reeb (2004) encontraron que la presencia moderada de la familia en la junta directiva ofrece beneficios sustanciales; por ejemplo, muestran que las ef que poseen pocos miembros independientes en la junta directiva presentan resultados significativamente peores que las enf.…”
Section: H1 La Implementación De Prácticas De Gobierno Corporativo Sunclassified
“…Others consider that this strong relationship between family and business may be somewhat negative. Brenes et al (2011) state that family businesses result from the interaction between the business system and the family system which sometimes causes conflicts, making management more complex. This complexity happens because management of the family business has to do with business and also with family (Sorenson, 1999;Arrègle and Mari, 2010).…”
Section: Figure 1 Organisation Of Innovation and Learningmentioning
confidence: 99%