Oxford Handbooks Online 2018
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.50
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Corporate Governance and Its Political Economy

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Cited by 11 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…These opportunistic motivations of managers to engage in CSR may lead to excessively high levels of CSR performance from the shareholders' point of view. Managers may also seek to satisfy the interests of some stakeholders, at the expense of shareholder value (Cespa & Cestone, ; Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, & Vlachos, ; Jensen, ) especially if they feel accountable to stakeholders, or seek to form a coalition to reinforce their position (Cespa & Cestone, ; Jackson, ; Roe & Vatiero, ; Surroca & Tribò, ). In this line, Petrovits () finds evidence of the strategic use of corporate philanthropy programs to achieve earnings targets, by creating earnings reserves, whereas Prior, Surroca, and Tribó () report a positive link between CSR performance and earnings management and claim that managers may use CSR strategically to disguise earnings management.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These opportunistic motivations of managers to engage in CSR may lead to excessively high levels of CSR performance from the shareholders' point of view. Managers may also seek to satisfy the interests of some stakeholders, at the expense of shareholder value (Cespa & Cestone, ; Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, & Vlachos, ; Jensen, ) especially if they feel accountable to stakeholders, or seek to form a coalition to reinforce their position (Cespa & Cestone, ; Jackson, ; Roe & Vatiero, ; Surroca & Tribò, ). In this line, Petrovits () finds evidence of the strategic use of corporate philanthropy programs to achieve earnings targets, by creating earnings reserves, whereas Prior, Surroca, and Tribó () report a positive link between CSR performance and earnings management and claim that managers may use CSR strategically to disguise earnings management.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Between the citizens and the politicians and between the politicians and the public administration, "some sort of negotiation" takes place "which, if the transitive property is applied, should guarantee a dialectic relationship between public administration and the citizen, albeit mediated by the politician. It is necessary to understand whether this model corresponds to reality" [21] (p. 104), i.e., if the conduct of public administration under the aegis of politics is going to yield government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption [22].…”
Section: The Concept Of Governance and The Public Administrationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This literature argues that there is a complementarity between armed corporate governance equilibrium and incremental sectors (which involve specific investments, where the term specificity is intended along with Oliver Williamson's contribution) and a complementarity between disarmed corporate governance equilibrium and radical innovation (which relates to general‐purpose investments—cf. Hall and Soskice, ; Pagano, ; Roe and Vatiero, ). In other words, corporate governance structures characterized by high corporate ownership concentration and high labour protection encourage activities with a “modular” step‐by‐step progression (i.e., incremental innovation) and committed assets (i.e., asset‐specificity).…”
Section: Swiss Equilibrium Of Corporate Governance and Innovationmentioning
confidence: 99%