2005
DOI: 10.1016/j.cpa.2003.08.008
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Corporate governance and profit manipulation: a French field study

Abstract: Profit manipulation has been largely studied through Positive Accounting Theory (PAT). However, the weakness of the results obtained would suggest using different theoretical and methodological approaches to examine this subject. In France, management controllers play a central role in profit manipulation. This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of their profit manipulation practices. Using results from 32 interviews in 13 companies, we argue that the spread of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model has fos… Show more

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Cited by 62 publications
(46 citation statements)
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“…Countries and companies compete on the price and quality of their goods and services, and compete for financial resources in global financial markets. These global market pressures, to a certain extent, are driving many countries (in particular emerging and less developed) to change and conform to the so-called 'international benchmark' of corporate governance practices (predominantly based on the Anglo-American models) (see Uddin and Choudhury, forthcoming;Lambert and Sponem, 2005;Beeson, 2001;Economist, 2000;Millstein, 2000).…”
Section: Globalisation and The Emergence Of Corporate Governance Refomentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Countries and companies compete on the price and quality of their goods and services, and compete for financial resources in global financial markets. These global market pressures, to a certain extent, are driving many countries (in particular emerging and less developed) to change and conform to the so-called 'international benchmark' of corporate governance practices (predominantly based on the Anglo-American models) (see Uddin and Choudhury, forthcoming;Lambert and Sponem, 2005;Beeson, 2001;Economist, 2000;Millstein, 2000).…”
Section: Globalisation and The Emergence Of Corporate Governance Refomentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consequently, the model of governance adopted and implemented in Malaysia after the 1997/1998 crisis was the easily accessible and so-called 'internationally accepted' AngloAmerican regimes (Liew, 2007;Ow-Yong and Cheah, 2000). However, it remains open to doubt as to whether the globally-favoured Anglo-American corporate governance codes and practices deliver the promised levels of accountability and transparency (Uddin and Choudhury, forthcoming;Singh and Zammit, 2006;Lambert and Sponem, 2005), let alone whether there is a relationship between such systems and levels or quality of organisational and economic performance (see Moxey, 2004). For example, Lambert and Sponem (2005) argued that the spread of Anglo-American corporate governance model in French companies (with the increase in shareholder pressure) has resulted in a rise in the practice of profit manipulation and a reduction in the relevance of financial statements.…”
Section: Globalisation and The Emergence Of Corporate Governance Refomentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The third theme we identified relates to fallacies in current accounting-related theories such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (McGoun, 1993), the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Rosen, 1990;Soufian, Forbes & Hudson, 2014), mainstream finance theory (Hudson et al, 1999;Coleman, 2014), Positive Accounting Theory (Martens & Stevens, 1993;Neu & Simmons, 1996;Milne, 2002;Chabrak, 2005;Lambert & Sponem, 2005), principal-agent theory (Ogden, 1993;Chwastiak, 1999;Mihret, 2014), as well as individual accounting measures (Jensen, 1990;McGoun, 1990). …”
Section: Legitimating Accounting Theoriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This means that the person sent by the finance division is no more welcome in the operational departments than the external auditor in the very same finance division: each person is careful not to disclose any information that might put their superior (or junior) in difficulty without prior consent, which would be perceived as a form of denunciation. This leads certain business partner-style management controllers who are strongly involved in the business units to collude with managers to subvert hierarchical control (Lambert and Sponem, 2005;Lambert and Sponem, 2012).…”
Section: The Ambivalence Of Controlmentioning
confidence: 99%