Corporate governance challenges in emerging economies

Armitage, Seth; Hou, Wenxuan; Sarkar, Subrata; Talaulicar, Till

doi:10.1111/corg.12209

Cited by 63 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 132 publications

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“…For instance, option pay (Harris & Bromiley, 2007;O'Connor, Priem, Coombs, & Gilley, 2006) and institutional ownership (Burns et al, 2010;Hadani et al, 2011) have been found to influence accounting fraud. We extend this stream of research by uncovering the role of state ownership in restraining securities fraud in China, extending corporate misconduct research in emerging economies (Armitage et al, 2017).…”

Section: Models and Results For Hypotheses 1 Andmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…Second, the role of ownership structure has been a core topic in corporate misconduct (Burns, Kedia, & Lipson, ; Cheng & Firth, ; Hadani, Goranova, & Khan, ; Shi et al, ). We extend and test this body of work within the context of concentrated ownership, more salient outside North America, contributing to corporate governance research in emerging economies (Armitage, Hou, Sarkar, & Talaulicar, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 87%

“…Second, the role of ownership structure has been a core topic in corporate misconduct (Burns, Kedia, & Lipson, 2010;Cheng & Firth, 2005;Hadani, Goranova, & Khan, 2011;Shi et al, 2017). We extend and test this body of work within the context of concentrated ownership, more salient outside North America, contributing to corporate governance research in emerging economies (Armitage, Hou, Sarkar, & Talaulicar, 2017 (Economist, 2012). Agency theory suggests that the state as a controlling shareholder can adversely affect the interests of non-state minority shareholders (Borisova, Brockman, Salas, & Zagorchev, 2012;Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

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State ownership and securities fraud: A political governance perspective

Shi

Aguilera

Wang

2020

Corporate Governance

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Research question/issue This study attempts to shed new light on how the state as a controlling shareholder can affect the interests of minority shareholders by investigating the role of state ownership in deterring securities fraud commission. Research findings/insights Using archival data from a large sample of Chinese publicly traded firms, we uncover that state ownership is negatively associated with the likelihood of securities fraud commission. Further, CEO political background reinforces this negative relationship. We also uncover that firms with high state ownership are more likely to dismiss CEOs than those with low or no state ownership upon securities fraud detection. Theoretical/academic implications Departing from agency theory‐centric research on state ownership and corporate governance, this study introduces a political governance perspective to unpack the role of state ownership in corporate governance. Political governance refers to organizational control mechanisms deployed by political actors to achieve their objectives. Practitioner/policy implications Studying how political governance systems influence managerial behaviors is critical to gaining a complete insight into the implications of state ownership on corporate governance.

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Section: Models and Results For Hypotheses 1 Andmentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 87%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

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State ownership and securities fraud: A political governance perspective

Shi

Aguilera

Wang

2020

Corporate Governance

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“…Recent research has shown that corporate governance issues are fundamentally different in young entrepreneurial firms than in large, well‐established ones, and that these issues may vary across countries (Armitage, Sarkar, & Talaulicar, ; Bjørnskov & Foss, ; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, & Shleifer, ; Luo & Junkunc, ; Wright, Westhead, & Ucbasaran, ). While the latter has been studied extensively, the former has recently attracted much interest in connection with entrepreneurial firms active on a global scale (Zahra, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…their traditional counterparts, they don't have the added burdens that come with litigation, fines and other penalties that several large institutions have had to deal with in recent years. "-"An Inside Look at Fintech Marketplace Lenders", Forbes, February 27, 2016 2 1 | INTRODUCTION Recent research has shown that corporate governance issues are fundamentally different in young entrepreneurial firms than in large, wellestablished ones, and that these issues may vary across countries (Armitage, Sarkar, & Talaulicar, 2017;Bjørnskov & Foss, 2013;Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002;Luo & Junkunc, 2008;Wright, Westhead, & Ucbasaran, 2007). While the latter has been studied extensively, the former has recently attracted much interest in connection with entrepreneurial firms active on a global scale (Zahra, 2014).…”

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confidence: 99%

Fintech venture capital

Cumming

Schwienbacher

2018

Corporate Governance

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Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue Where are fintech venture capital investments taking place around the world? What is the role of institutional factors on the international allocation of fintech venture capital? Research Findings/Insights We document a notable change in the pattern of fintech venture capital (VC) investments around the world relative to other types of investments after the global financial crisis. We show that fintech venture capital investments are relatively more common in countries with weaker regulatory enforcement and without a major financial center after the financial crisis. Also, we show the fintech boom is more pronounced for smaller private limited partnership venture capitalists that likely have less experience with prior venture capital booms and busts. These fintech VC deals are substantially more likely to be liquidated, especially when located in countries without a major financial center. Theoretical/Academic Implications We build on the institutions and corporate governance literatures by showing the importance of enforcement in driving relative differences in investment patterns and investor participation. For entrepreneurial startups, regulatory arbitrage drives investment into countries with a dearth of enforcement and regulatory costs. We argue that the spike in fintech venture capital in certain countries is attributable to differential enforcement of financial institution rules amongst startups versus large established financial institutions after the financial crisis. Practitioner/Policy Implications Regulatory arbitrage in the context of fintech venture capital can spur booms and busts. Less experienced venture capitalists seem more prone to undertake investments that exacerbate boom and bust cycles. National governance is strengthened by the enforcement of regulatory standards, and corporate governance through investor experience and oversight can mitigate these swings, and facilitate better investment outcomes.

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Gender diversity, intellectual capital, and family ownership: An empirical test of Kanter's hypothesis

Ali,

Amin,

Rehman

et al. 2024

Bus Strat Dev

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This study examines the relationship between gender diversity and intellectual capital performance, and moderating role of family ownership on this relationship. The study used 3730 firm‐year observations of 307 nonfinancial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period 2008–2020 and employed ordinary least squares regression analysis to test the hypotheses. More specifically, the study used group composition (skewed board, tilted board, and balanced board) to examine multiple significance levels of gender diversity on boards, and used five measures (modified value‐added intellectual coefficient, human capital efficiency, structural capital efficiency, relational capital efficiency, and capital employed efficiency) of intellectual capital performance. Using lens of agency theory and resource dependence theory, we found that gender diversity positively influences intellectual capital performance, however, the strongest impact is apparent in case of balanced board. Moreover, family ownership positively influences this relationship. Our study complements the efforts of policy makers by providing empirical support for the mandatory placement of females on boards and urge them to increase number of females on corporate boards to derive maximum benefits of female directors. In addition, our results recommend the enhancement of the professional skills of women work force to ensure their maximum participation in the corporate sector.

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Corporate governance challenges in emerging economies

Cited by 63 publications

References 132 publications

State ownership and securities fraud: A political governance perspective

State ownership and securities fraud: A political governance perspective

Fintech venture capital

Gender diversity, intellectual capital, and family ownership: An empirical test of Kanter's hypothesis

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