Corporate governance challenges in Poland: evidence from “comply or explain” disclosures

Campbell, Kevin; Jerzemowska, Magdalena; Najman, Krzysztof

doi:10.1108/14720700910998184

Cited by 22 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Prior empirical CGC studies have used content analysis to investigate the compliance and especially the non-compliance explanations (Arcot et al, 2010;Campbell et al, 2009;Stiles and Taylor, 1993;Werder et al, 2005), as this qualitative method is widely used in financial accounting research (Beattie, 2005;Guthrie and Petty, 2000;Yi and Davey, 2010). Although this method has various advantages (see Guthrie et al, 2004;Krippendorff, 2013), a series of recent studies criticizes the way in which the research content is analyzed (Beattie and Thomson, 2007;Striukova et al, 2008).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring the quality of the “comply or explain” approach

Nerantzidis

2015

Managerial Auditing Journal

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Purpose – This paper provides evidence regarding the efficacy of the “comply or explain” approach in Greece and has three objectives: to improve our knowledge of the concept of this accountability mechanism, to elevate auditors’ potential role in the control of corporate governance (CG) statements and to contribute to the discussion about the reform of this principle; a prolonged dialogue that has been started by European Commission in the light of the recent financial crisis. Design/methodology/approach – The approach taken is a content analysis of CG statements and Web sites of a non-probability sample of 144 Greek listed companies on the Athens Stock Exchange for the year 2011. Particularly, 52 variables were evaluated from an audit compliance perspective using a coding scheme. From this procedure, the level of compliance with Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV) code, as well as the content of the explanations provided for non-compliance, were rated. Findings – The results show that although the degree of compliance is low (the average governance rating is 35.27 per cent), the evaluation of explanations of non-compliance is even lower (from the 64.73 per cent of the non-compliance, the 40.95 per cent provides no explanation at all). Research limitations/implications – The research limitations are associated with the content analysis methodology, as well as the reliability of CG statements. Practical implications – This study indicates that companies on the one hand tend to avoid the compliance with these recommendation practices, raising questions regarding the effectiveness of the SEV code; while on the other, they are not in line with the spirit of the CG code, as they do not provide adequate explanations. These results assist practitioners and/or policy-makers in perceiving the efficacy of the “comply or explain” approach. Originality/value – While there is a great body of research that has looked into the compliance with best practices, this study is different because it is the first one that rates not only the degree of the compliance with the code’s practices but also the content of the explanations provided for non-compliance. This is particularly interesting because it adds to the body of research by providing a new approach in measuring the quality of the “comply or explain” principle in-depth.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring the quality of the “comply or explain” approach

Nerantzidis

2015

Managerial Auditing Journal

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“…Each country established and followed its own approach to financial and economic restructuring (Lang, 2005; Berglöf and Pajuste, 2003; Frydman et al , 2000; Török, 1998). Substantial differences can be observed in the way new ownership affects corporate economic performance in different countries (Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007, Backhaus, 2003, Frydman et al , 1999) and within a country (Bulgaria: Keremidchiev, 2004, Michailova, 1997; the Czech Republic: Mertlik, 1997; Hungary: Meagher, 2002; Voszka, 1999; Mihályi, 1997; Poland: Campbell et al , 2009; Koladkiewicz, 2001; Belka et al , 1999; Romania: Earle and Telegdy, 2002; Serbia: Hadžic, 2002; Slovenia: Bainbridge and Bohinc, 2001; Russia: Black et al , 2000; and Ukraine: Zheka, 2005).…”

Section: Corporate Governance Variables In Ceementioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate governance variables: lessons from a holistic approach to Central‐Eastern European practice

Hardi

Buti²

2012

Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society

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PurposeIn Central Eastern Europe (CEE) the transition to market democracy significantly influenced the emerging corporate governance practice. The region, however, demonstrates much more diversity in corporate governance than expected in generally similar transition economies and the variables and their impacts only partially overlap with the variables of corporate governance in other regions. This research aims to focus on how to help discover and explain these similarities and differences.Design/methodology/approachThis paper is a review of the secondary literature. The review is carried out with the intention of providing an opportunity to map out new terrains or provide critiques of the direction of a research field. The majority of literature reviewed in the paper is published in refereed journals, but other resources like book chapters, conference papers, reports and in certain cases unpublished materials are added. The paper discusses the key topics and variables according to the requirements of a holistic approach to corporate governance.FindingsThe review of available literature indicates that much work has been done on a significant set of variables of corporate governance, both in the domestic (privatization and the legal environment primarily, institutions and market conditions secondarily) and the international (impact of foreign direct investment, European Union directives and expectations, globalization and global institutions like OECD and the WB) context, but this body of research has not been discussed comparatively, within the context of a holistic model. Existing literature in the first two decades after transition has devoted less attention to issues of hierarchy and institutions of corporate governance, although they have relevance to better understand the impact of the macro‐level factors on corporate governance practices and their differences in the region. The paper has indicated the importance of a systematic review of macro‐level factors, both internal and external from a national perspective, influencing corporate governance practices.Research limitations/implicationsA systematic review of the variables of corporate governance in CEE has been missing to date and the theoretical framework adequate for pursuing such research is emerging only recently. The further elaboration and application of a holistic approach is necessary to analyze the numerous aspects that influence and shape corporate governance structures and practices in transition economies and to understand the differences that prevail even after two decades of transition to market democracy.Originality/valueThe paper provides a comprehensive review of the literature on corporate governance practices and the factors influencing the emergence and impact of those codes in CEE. It argues for a holistic approach not applied before in the research of corporate governance in transition economies; and discusses the role of external and domestic macro‐level factors in explaining the differences in the emerging national practices. It e...

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“…A number of studies have emanated from continental Europe, which identify deficiencies in the promotion of corporate governance (Cuervo, 2002). More specific country analyses of corporate governance codes point to a similar direction in the Netherlands (Akkermans et al, 2007;de Jong et al, 2005;Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011), Germany (Seidl et al, 2013), Slovenia (Cankar et al, 2010), Poland (Campbell et al, 2009) and Greece (Nerantzidis, 2015). Hence, the use of voluntary codes in continental Europe seems rather complex and involves an interplay of several factors, including ownership structures, institutional considerations and even cultural factors, due to which 'the compliance rate seems to convey rather mixed messages' (Sergakis, 2015).…”

Section: Self-regulation In the Concentrated Shareholding Contextmentioning

confidence: 97%

Proliferation of corporate governance codes in the backdrop of divergent ownership structures

Varottil

2018

Competition & Change

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In the backdrop of the convergence–divergence debate, the goal of this article is to examine the proliferation of corporate governance codes in the light of a single factor, namely varying corporate ownership structures across countries. While such codes emanated and became popular in the United Kingdom where companies largely display dispersed shareholding, the concept has been disseminated to countries that carry considerably different ownership structures, i.e. mainly concentrated shareholding. This is bound to give rise to incongruities in the implementation of these codes. In order to enunciate the claim made above, the article will consider two aspects that convergence advocates have focused on, namely (i) shareholder empowerment and (ii) self-regulation. For example, corporate governance codes place considerable emphasis on the structure and independence of the boards of directors of companies as a means to ensure shareholder protection. While this approach is meant to produce results in companies with dispersed shareholding, the same cannot be said of companies with concentrated shareholding where the empowerment of shareholders through director independence or other means would only embolden the already dominant controlling shareholders. Moving to self-regulation, a voluntary code operating on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis can ensure sufficient adherence only if certain factors are present in the jurisdiction where it is applied. Relying upon available empirical evidence, this article finds that use of self-regulation in voluntary codes of corporate governance may generate different results depending upon the ownership structures of companies, thereby exhibiting signs of divergence on this count.

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Corporate governance challenges in Poland: evidence from “comply or explain” disclosures

Cited by 22 publications

References 11 publications

Measuring the quality of the “comply or explain” approach

Measuring the quality of the “comply or explain” approach

Corporate governance variables: lessons from a holistic approach to Central‐Eastern European practice

Proliferation of corporate governance codes in the backdrop of divergent ownership structures

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