Corporate Governance Compliance and Disclosure in the Banking Sector: Using Data from Japan

Boolaky, Pran Krishansing; Thomas, K. J.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1536879

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

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“…The literature on the subject of disclosure differences between financial and non-financial firms is contradicting. Eng and Mak (2003) report that there are no differences, whereas Boolaky and Thomas (2010) report that the opposite.…”

Section: Findings-statistical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Disclosure Factors of Executive Managers Remuneration: A Probit Model

Lazarides¹

2010

American Journal of Economics and Business Administration

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Problem statement:The study contributes to the literature that argues that the convergence trend of corporate governance systems is either nominal or hasn't the impact that the advocates of this theory hypothesize. Approach: The objective of the study was to test this hypothesis the key issue of remuneration had been chosen to illustrate that the differences of corporate governance systems still exist and they have a substantial impact on business environment. Disclosure or not of information regarding these issues preoccupies regulating, legislative authorities as well as capital market participants. The study, using a probit regression analysis, examined whether these differences are observable in Greece. Greece is a country with the typical characteristics of a Continental Europe corporate governance system. The results were compared with the reported characteristics of AngloSaxon countries. The study analyzed data over a period of 6 years (2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006). The 60 firms largest, in terms of capitalization and free float, were used. Results: The major factors that affect the remuneration disclosure were the adoption of mergers and acquisitions as the method to expand firm's size, the investments risks that the firm is willing to take, stock market capitalization, board of directors size, capital to sales ratio, number of independent board of directors member dismissals and the quality of corporate governance. These differences were significantly different than the ones reported for Anglo-Saxon countries. Conclusion: The study had proven that remuneration disclosure levels in Greece are defined by a different set of factors than the ones in a typical Anglo-Saxon country. Policy and regulation makers should take into account these differences and not adopt isomorphic approaches to different problems and situations.

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Section: Findings-statistical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Disclosure Factors of Executive Managers Remuneration: A Probit Model

Lazarides¹

2010

American Journal of Economics and Business Administration

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Corporate Governance Compliance and Disclosure in the Banking Sector: Using Data from Japan

Cited by 1 publication

References 46 publications

Disclosure Factors of Executive Managers Remuneration: A Probit Model

Disclosure Factors of Executive Managers Remuneration: A Probit Model

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