Corporate governance, corporate health accounting, and firm value: The case of HIV/AIDS disclosures in Sub-Saharan Africa

Ntim, Collins G.

doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2016.04.006

Cited by 103 publications

(149 citation statements)

References 130 publications

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“…This is measured as the ratio total number of directors of total sales. This is different from the measurement used in other empirical studies (see Daniel & Naveen, 2008;Ntim 2016). Though the contribution of board size in improving board monitoring function remains inconclusive, there is a preposition that board size is not uniform across firms.…”

Section: Measurement Of Variablesmentioning

confidence: 70%

“…First, Nigeria and Ghana (with the exception of South Africa) stock exchanges are the most active and largest in the sub-Saharan region in terms of number of companies listed and market capitalization valued at $114.2 and $28.2 billion respectively as at 2013. Second, they share a number a common attributes: (i) they are all countries of Anglo-Saxon origin with similar accounting, auditing, corporate governance mechanisms, and legal systems; (ii) they have adopted the international financial reporting standards; and (iii) they have similar corporate law and ownership structures (Ntim, 2016).…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Impact of Corporate Board Size on Firm Performance: Evidence from Ghana and Nigeria

Badu¹,

Appiah²

2017

RBM

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This paper examines the impact of corporate board size on firm performance for a sample of 137 listed firms in Ghana and Nigeria. Our findings suggest a statistically significant and positive relationship between board size and firm performance, implying that in Ghana and Nigeria allowing corporate board size to be dependent of firm size tends to improve firm performance. Our findings are consistent across different kinds of models that deal with different types of endogeneities and corporate performance proxies. Our results provide empirical support for agency theory, which suggests that optimal corporate board size effectively advise, monitor and discipline management thereby improving firm performance.

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Section: Measurement Of Variablesmentioning

confidence: 70%

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Corporate Board Size on Firm Performance: Evidence from Ghana and Nigeria

Badu¹,

Appiah²

2017

RBM

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“…By the same token, stakeholder theory assumes that firms with larger boards can get greater access to their external environment, which as result secures resources such as finance and business contracts and reduces uncertainties (Jia et al, 2009). On the other hand, others claim that larger boards are associated with poor communication and monitoring leading to a negative impact on firms' disclosure behaviour (Herman, 1981, Jensen, 1993Ntim, 2016). In addition, resource dependence theory postulates that larger boards are more likely to consist of greater diversity of expertise and stakeholder representation, which can contribute to improved corporate reputation (Lajili andZéghal, 2005, Linsley andShrives, 2006).…”

Section: Corporate Governance Characteristicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate boards, ownership structures and corporate disclosures

Alnabsha

Abdou

Ntim

et al. 2018

JAAR

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141

136

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Purpose: This paper investigates the effect of corporate board attributes, ownership structure and firm-level characteristics on both corporate mandatory and voluntary disclosure behaviour in annual reports of Libyan firms.Design/methodology/approach: Multivariate regression techniques are used to estimate the effect of corporate board and ownership structures on mandatory and voluntary disclosures of a sample of Libyan firms between 2006 and 2010.Findings: First, we find that board size, board composition, the frequency of board meetings and the presence of an audit committee have an impact on the level of corporate disclosure. Second, this study finds an evidence that director ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership and institutional ownership have a non-linear effect on the level of corporate disclosure. Finally, we find that firm age, liquidity, listing status, industry type and auditor type are positively associated with the level of corporate disclosure.Limitation: Future research could investigate disclosure practices using other channels of corporate disclosure, such as corporate websites. Useful insights may be offered also by future studies by conducting in-depth interviews with corporate managers, directors and owners regarding these issues.Implication: Investors may also rely on such corporate governance characteristics to shape expectations about voluntary and/or mandatory information disclosure. Originality/value: Existing disclosure studies have mainly examined governance and voluntary disclosure relationship in non-listed firms. Our study, therefore, extends, as well as contributes to the existing literature by the examining the governance-disclosure nexus relating to both mandatory and voluntary disclosures in both listed and non-listed firms.

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“…Second, and following previous studies (Core et al, 1999;Jimenez-Angueira & Stuart, 2015;Elghuweel et al, 2016;Elmagrhi et al, 2016;Ntim et al, 2016), our criteria ensured that the conditions for a balanced panel analysis were satisfied with its well documented advantages. Third, as suggested by Wowak et al (2011) and Ntim (2016), examination of a 10-year data with both cross-sectional and time series properties may be useful in ascertaining whether the 15 observed cross-sectional link between executive pay and performance is robust over time. Finally, the sample begins in 2002 because there is limited data coverage in the Perfect Information Database/DataStream on SA companies prior to that year, and crucially because King II came into effect in 2002.…”

Section: Data Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Executive pay and performance: the moderating effect of CEO power and governance structure

Ntim

Lindop

Thomas

et al. 2017

The International Journal of Human Resource Management

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Executive pay and performance: the moderating effect of CEO power and governance structure. International Journal of Human Resource Management,(doi:10.1080/09585192.2017 This is the author's final accepted version.There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/121453/ Executive pay and performance: The moderating effect of CEO power and governance structure AbstractThis paper examines the crucial question of whether chief executive officer (CEO) power and corporate governance (CG) structure can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) using a large up-to-date South African dataset. Our findings are three-fold. First, when direct links between executive pay and performance are examined, we find a positive, but relatively small PPS. Second, our results show that in a context of concentrated ownership and weak board structures; the second-tier agency conflict (director monitoring power and opportunism) is stronger than the first-tier agency problem (CEO power and self-interest). Third, additional analysis suggests that CEO power and CG structure have a moderating effect on the PPS. Specifically, we find that the PPS is higher in firms with more reputable, founding and shareholding CEOs, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards, more powerful, and long-tenured CEOs. Overall, our evidence sheds new important theoretical and empirical insights on explaining the PPS with specific focus on the predictions of the optimal contracting and managerial power hypotheses. The findings are generally robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, pay, and performance proxies.

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Corporate governance, corporate health accounting, and firm value: The case of HIV/AIDS disclosures in Sub-Saharan Africa

Cited by 103 publications

References 130 publications

The Impact of Corporate Board Size on Firm Performance: Evidence from Ghana and Nigeria

The Impact of Corporate Board Size on Firm Performance: Evidence from Ghana and Nigeria

Corporate boards, ownership structures and corporate disclosures

Executive pay and performance: the moderating effect of CEO power and governance structure

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