2006
DOI: 10.22495/cocv3i4c1p2
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Corporate governance for knowledge production: Theoretical foundations and practical implications

Abstract: Agency Theory as the dominant view of Corporate Governance disregards that the key task of firm governance is to generate, accumulate, transfer, and protect firm specific knowledge. Three different foundations to the theory of the firm which underpin different concepts of corporate governance are discussed: The traditional view of the firm as a nexus of contracts, the view of the firm as a nexus of firm specific investments and the view of the firm as a nexus of firm specific knowledge investments. The latter … Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(7 citation statements)
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References 66 publications
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“…The value relevance of structural capital disclosure, however, is not associated with board structure characteristics. As structural capital comprises mainly of internal sharing knowledge of an organisation, this result confirmsOsterloh and Frey's (2006) argument that the ability of independent directors to improve the value relevance of structural capital might be limited because they do not have sufficient firm-specific knowledge. With regard to the general information such as human and relational capital, consistent with the expectations, board size and independence improve the quality (i.e.…”
supporting
confidence: 79%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…The value relevance of structural capital disclosure, however, is not associated with board structure characteristics. As structural capital comprises mainly of internal sharing knowledge of an organisation, this result confirmsOsterloh and Frey's (2006) argument that the ability of independent directors to improve the value relevance of structural capital might be limited because they do not have sufficient firm-specific knowledge. With regard to the general information such as human and relational capital, consistent with the expectations, board size and independence improve the quality (i.e.…”
supporting
confidence: 79%
“…Therefore, H2b is not supported. According to Osterloh and Frey (2006), only insiders can evaluate firm-specific knowledge generation and transformation. Outsiders, on the other hand, do not have sufficient relevant knowledge.…”
Section: The Level Of Intellectualmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Moreover, the focus shifts from shareholders to the firm as a whole, in line with stewardship theory. A consequence is that director selection becomes paramount and that the chair should be an outsider to the firm (cf., Osterloh and Frey, 2006). As discussed in our theory section, within an OTB individual directors in all likelihood have broader roles and responsibilities than in a TTB.…”
Section: Solutions To the Dilemmasmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…Therefore, H2b is not supported. According to Osterloh and Frey (2006), only insiders can evaluate firm-specific knowledge generation and transformation. Outsiders, on the other hand, do not have sufficient relevant knowledge.…”
Section: The Level Of Intellectualmentioning
confidence: 99%