Corporate governance in emerging markets: An introduction

Chen, Sheng‐Syan; Huang, Ying Sophie

doi:10.1016/j.iref.2014.01.003

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Corporate ownership is highly concentrated in East Asia with weak legal systems, less transparent disclosure of financial reporting, and ineffective corporate governance mechanisms such as boards of directors (Fan & Wong, 2002;Chen & Huang, 2014). Thus, controlling owners have greater incentives to reduce earnings quality in East Asia than that in the United States.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Family firms and earnings management in Taiwan: Influence of corporate governance

Wen

Hung

Cheng

et al. 2015

International Review of Economics & Finance

170

107

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Family firms and earnings management in Taiwan: Influence of corporate governance

Wen

Hung

Cheng

et al. 2015

International Review of Economics & Finance

170

107

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“…CEO duality may also impair independent or outside directors' ability to bring independent advice and judgement to the board (Christopher, 2010;. Generally, previous studies have recognised CEO duality as an important variable as it has been the main highlight in the stewardship-agency perspective (Balachandran & Faff, 2015;Brennan & Solomon, 2008;Chen & Huang, 2014;Cheung et al, 2011;Jones, 2008;Zabri et al, 2016). The perspective is deemed relevant to be extended to MFIs given that they are run by NGOs, which often appoint the board chairman as the organisation's CEO.…”

Section: Theoretical Discussion and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The percentage of the board of directors with whom the MFIs do not have any kind of relationship or affiliation (Christopher, 2010;Davis, 2005;Freeman, 2010). Board size BS A total number of board members (Chen & Huang, 2014;Zagorchev & Gao, 2015).…”

Section: Inddmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of board independence on microfinance institutions’ performance: The case of Bangladesh

Hussain

Azhar

Rahman

2021

AJAP

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This study aims to examine the relationship between board independence and the performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs). Early studies on microfinance have made immense contributions, particularly in identifying the factors that influence performance. However, studies addressing board independence and its impact on performance remain scarce. Design/ Methodology/ Approach: This study utilised a panel dataset involving 80 MFIs in Bangladesh for the period of 2005-2018. A panel data regression technique was applied to measure the relationship between MFIs' performance and board independence based on the 80 cross-sectional MFIs with 13 years of data. Research findings: Our findings suggest that independent directors and board size facilitate MFIs to become financially sustainable. The findings also indicate that CEO duality enhances institutional sustainability but does not enhance outreach to the poor. While the results of this study partially support the proposition of stewardship theory, the proposition of agency theory is rejected. This indicates that MFIs in Bangladesh are operated by motivated agents with similar interests to the MFIs' owners. Theoretical contribution/ Originality: This investigation contributes to the microfinance governance literature by highlighting the argument that board independence reduces conflict between MFIs' principle and agent. This study also contributes to the global debate concerning CEO duality and MFIs' double bottom line performance from the perspective of a developing country, such as Bangladesh. Practitioner/ Policy implication: The practical implication of this research is on governance mechanisms in terms of their effectiveness, which is influenced by MFIs' competence. Since board members should promote stakeholders' interests rather than the interests of the organisation, there is a need for sound guiding principles that should form an integral part of the policy for better MFI governance practices. Limitation/ Implication: The limitation of this study mainly concerns the lack of evidence concerning whether or not every licensed MFI in Bangladesh has non-manageable stakeholders. Similarly, this study fails to capture the insolvency level of customers. Therefore, future studies may expand on this approach and create a measure for MFIs' outreach to the poor.

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“…Board of Independence is the ratio of independent commissioners to total commissioners. Anderson & Reeb (2004); Beasley (1996);Chen (2014). Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983); Chi et al (2015) suggest that outside directors have an incentive to effectively monitor management actions to maintain their value of capital and reputation.…”

Section: Theoretical Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of corporate governance in the relationships of family company with real earnings management

Masri¹

2018

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Abstract:The purpose of this research was to determine the effect of family ownership on real earnings management with corporate governance as a moderation variable in this relationship. This research is also looking at the role of accrual earnings management as a substitute in the relationship accrual earnings management with real earnings management in a family company. This study uses data 61 manufacturing companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period 2010 to 2013. The research results according to which hypothesized that family firms tend to negatively affect with real earnings management. The role of corporate governance as strengthening internal oversight negative effect on family companies with real earnings management. The results also proved the existence of a relationship of substitution for family firms tend to be doing accrual earnings management than real earnings management. This is because on the one hand the motivation of control as a strong incentive to do accrual earnings management in the family company, while on the other hand, the family companies tend to dislike real earnings management for their negative performance impact.

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Corporate governance in emerging markets: An introduction

Cited by 10 publications

References 14 publications

Family firms and earnings management in Taiwan: Influence of corporate governance

Family firms and earnings management in Taiwan: Influence of corporate governance

Effects of board independence on microfinance institutions’ performance: The case of Bangladesh

The role of corporate governance in the relationships of family company with real earnings management

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