Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: an overview of the application of the Tabaksblat Code in 2004

Akkermans, Dirk; Ees, Hans van; Hermes, Niels; Hooghiemstra, Reginald; Laan, G. van der; Postma, T.J.B.M.; Witteloostuijn, A. van

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00634.x

Cited by 88 publications

(93 citation statements)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Day and Woodward (2004) distinguish between substantive and symbolic disclosure, finding the majority to be merely symbolic. Akkermans et al (2007Akkermans et al ( , p. 1113 report that many companies only provide "generally applicable arguments." In contrast, Sheath and Land (2006, p. 4) state that "Investors want a company to use its report to reflect its specific approach to governance."…”

Section: Specificitymentioning

confidence: 99%

A typology for exploring the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate governance regulations

Shrives

Brennan

2015

The British Accounting Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Citation: Shrives, Philip and Brennan, Niamh (2015) A typology for exploring the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate governance regulations. The British Accounting Review, 47 (1 Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access the University's research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. Single copies of full items can be reproduced, displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder. The full policy is available online: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version of the research, please visit the publisher's website (a subscription may be required.)A typology for exploring the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate governance regulations There were 204 (125) non-compliant companies, 537 (253) Code breaches and 438 (208) explanations for non-compliance, an average of 2.6 (2.0) Code breaches and 2.2 (1.7) explanations per non-compliant company. Although compliance increased over the period examined, explanations were found to be of variable quality. Results suggest that companies need to improve the quality of their explanations if they are to be useful to users, notably location, complexity and specificity of explanations. There are also important questions raised about the work of auditors and their apparent silence. Companies are being encouraged to move towards compliance. We argue that this is against the 'comply-or-explain' philosophy which accepts that 'one size does not fit all.'Better quality of explanation is more important than compliance and thus companies may be unwittingly heading in the wrong direction.

show abstract

Section: Specificitymentioning

confidence: 99%

A typology for exploring the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate governance regulations

Shrives

Brennan

2015

The British Accounting Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This Tabaksblat code came into effect in January 2004 (Akkermans et al 2007). In addition, from the fiscal year 2002 onwards, Dutch listed companies are required by law to disclose remuneration details of individual executives.…”

Section: Dutch Corporate Governance Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is pay related to performance in The Netherlands? An analysis of Dutch executive compensation, 2002–2006

2010

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

SummaryThis paper analyzes the characteristics of Dutch pay arrangements. We show that (1) studying executive compensation outside the Anglo-American countries adds insights to the pay for performance literature, (2) pay for performance relations are different for various types of executives and for various compensation components, (3) attention to the methodological treatment of conditional stock (option) grants is important, and (4) researchers should go beyond stock market performance indicators to detect the performance relatedness of pay. All in all, a myriad of payperformance relationships has been found for the Dutch case, when the above is accounted for.

show abstract

“…If a company chooses not to comply with a best practice provision, it must report the provision and provide an explanation for non-compliance in its annual report ("complyor-explain" principle). Survey evidence for the year 2005 suggests that the level of compliance with the code is high, in particular, among firms that belong to the AEX (largecap) and AMX (mid-cap) stock indexes (Akkermans et al 2007). large-and mid-cap European stocks.…”

Section: The Dutch Corporate Governance Codementioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Leverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Arping

Sautner

2010

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe argue that the recent corporate governance reform in the Netherlands provides a natural experiment to explore the impact of changes in corporate governance on financing policy. We find that, relative to a control sample of comparable firms outside the Netherlands, Dutch firms significantly reduced their leverage following the passage of the reform. Our findings are consistent with the view that corporate governance improvements reduce the value of debt as a disciplining device.

show abstract

Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: an overview of the application of the Tabaksblat Code in 2004

Cited by 88 publications

References 23 publications

A typology for exploring the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate governance regulations

A typology for exploring the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate governance regulations

Is pay related to performance in The Netherlands? An analysis of Dutch executive compensation, 2002–2006

Corporate Governance and Leverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About