Corporate Governance, Market Discipline, and Productivity Growth

Abstract

Die Discussion Papers dienen einer möglichst schnellen Verbreitung von neueren Forschungsarbeiten des ZEW. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des ZEW dar. Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW research promptly available to other economists in order to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW.

Boards of Directors, Market Discipline and Firm Performance

“…A recent stream of research has examined the interaction of market competition and corporate governance on firm performance (Koke, 2001;Januszewski et al, 2001;Grosfeld and Tressel, 2001;Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999;and Nickell et al, 1997). The results suggest that competition and tight control, such as the presence of a strong ultimate owner, are complements.…”

Corporate control and relationship finance by banks or by non-bank institutional investors? A review within the theory of the firm

“…However, while external agents may be necessary, they cannot sustain an efficient outcome if the internal members of the team don't have some assurance that their product will not be expropriated (Falaschetti 2002). According to Köke (2001), ownership concentration and bank debt, as well as market discipline reflected by product market competition, are positively related to productivity growth. However, creditor influence depends on a strong position measured as a large fraction of bank debt.…”

“…However, creditor influence depends on a strong position measured as a large fraction of bank debt. Thus, the reduction of bank lending, for example through increasing securitization or issue of corporate bonds, could negatively affect the banks' incentives or ability to monitor (Köke 2001). Also relationship investing can involve a kind of team production, considering the cooperation between firms and institutional investors to share information and equity risks.…”

X-Ineffizienz, Managementanreize und Produktmarktwettbewerb

“…Dies wiederum steigert das Produktivitätswachstum in managerkontrollierten Unternehmen und verringert das Produktivitätswachstum in eigentümerkontrollierten Unternehmen. Köke (2001) führt eine vergleichbare Untersuchung für Firmen des Verarbeitenden Gewerbes in Deutschland durch. Hier ergibt sich ein positiver Einfluss der Eigentümerkonzentration auf das Produktivitätswachstum.…”

“…Short 1994 für einen Überblick). Nur eine sehr kleine Zahl von empirischen Untersuchungen widmet sich der Frage, wie Produktmarktwettbewerb und die Trennung von Eigentum und Kontrolle zusammenwirken (Palmer 1973;Nickell, Nicolitsas und Dryden 1997;Berger und Hannan 1998;Köke 2001).…”