Corporate governance, performance and take-overs: an empirical analysis of UK mergers

Weir, Charlie

doi:10.1080/000368497326291

Cited by 50 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…However, our result is in line with Ling and Ryngaert (1997), who state that larger blocks of shares held by outsiders might facilitate takeovers, both because of lower transaction costs and by reducing free-rider problems by small shareholders. Second, we find evidence for REITs that a relatively low number of non-executives on the board increase the takeover likelihood, which is consistent with Weir (1997) and North (2001). They document that non-executives are only weakly represented on the boards of targets, potentially leading to weaker boards and thus less efficient monitoring.…”

Section: Multivariate Resultssupporting

confidence: 68%

“…Moreover, we include governance and asset characteristics as control variables, where selection of variables is based on existing studies as well. More specifically, we include managerial ownership (North 2001;Song and Walkling 1993), block ownership (Schleifer and Vishny 1986), independence of the board (Shivdasani 1993;Weir 1997) and portfolio characteristics (Campbell et al 2001). All variables and their respective sources are listed in Appendix.…”

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confidence: 99%

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How Does the Market for Corporate Control Function for Property Companies?

Eichholtz

Kok

2007

J Real Estate Finan Econ

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We investigate 95 takeovers of property companies all over the world and find that only two of those are hostile. To determine the effectiveness of the market for corporate control, we first study characteristics of targets and acquirers compared to a control sample, using the complete global universe of listed property companies during the most recent takeover wave (1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004). We find that the inefficient management hypothesis holds for both REITs and non-REITs, as targets exhibit significant underperformance before takeovers. In the second part of this study, we investigate shareholder wealth effects following takeovers and confirm previous findings that abnormal returns for targets and bidders are distinctly different for the real estate sector. Moreover, we show that this difference not only holds for REIT-to-REIT mergers, but also for mergers of real estate firms without a REIT-status.

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Section: Multivariate Resultssupporting

confidence: 68%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

How Does the Market for Corporate Control Function for Property Companies?

Eichholtz

Kok

2007

J Real Estate Finan Econ

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“…Further, compliance has resulted in significant changes to board-related mechanisms, (Weir andLaing 1999 andYoung 2000). They show that since the Cadbury Report was published, UK quoted companies have increased non-executive director representation, reduced the incidence of duality and that the presence of board subcommittees, such as the audit and remuneration committees, is now much more frequently reported.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Internal and External Governance Mechanisms: Their Impact on the Performance of Large UK Public Companies

Weir

Laing

McKnight

2002

Business Fin & Account

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414

338

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This paper analyses the relationship between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and the performance of UK companies within the context of the Cadbury Committee's Code of Best Practice. The results show, first, that the market for corporate control is an effective governance mechanism that may be regarded as a substitute for the other mechanisms.Second, there is a weak relationship between the internal governance mechanisms and performance. Third, there is also little evidence that with firms in the top and bottom performance deciles have different internal governance characteristics. The results therefore raise questions about the efficacy of imposing prescriptive internal governance mechanisms on companies, particularly given that the market for corporate control has been shown to be an effective means of reducing agency costs.

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“…There are some advantage of executive directors like in shape of skill, relative knowledge and expertise but for the sake of fresh ideas, objectivity and independency the role of independent director should be incorporated (Firth et al, 2002;Weir & C, 1997). In addition ,the agency theory also suggest that the non-executive director on the board will provide the higher disclosure of various aspect of company.…”

Section: Board and Management Structure Disclosuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: The Role of Transparency & Disclosure in Banking Sector of Pakistan

Zaman

Arslan

Siddiqui

2014

ILSHS

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Purpose: This purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the relationship between transparency and disclosure and firm performance. Highlighting the importance of corporate governance in banking sector, the paper has focused in depth over its role, level and its impact on performance in banking industry of Pakistan. Design/methodology/approach: The paper access this purpose by constructing transparency and disclosure index for the past five year 2007-2011, using proxies for three sub-categories which are board and management structure disclosure, ownership structure disclosure and financial transparency disclosure. The paper also investigated structural changes of T&D Index and its effect on bank financial performance over the sample of 30 banks operating in Pakistan. Findings: Empirical analysis results by using ordinary least square regression model, reveals that financial performance is positively related to the transparency and disclosure and their sub levels except ownership structure disclosure which has negative relation with both ROA and ROE. Furthermore the average T&D level in Pakistani banking sector is above average. Practical implications: The current research paper aims for important policy implementation to reduce information asymmetry and improve corporate governance and firm performance in banking sector of Pakistan.

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Corporate governance, performance and take-overs: an empirical analysis of UK mergers

Cited by 50 publications

References 43 publications

How Does the Market for Corporate Control Function for Property Companies?

How Does the Market for Corporate Control Function for Property Companies?

Internal and External Governance Mechanisms: Their Impact on the Performance of Large UK Public Companies

Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: The Role of Transparency & Disclosure in Banking Sector of Pakistan

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Corporate governance, performance and take-overs: an empirical analysis of UK mergers

Cited by 50 publications

References 43 publications

How Does the Market for Corporate Control Function for Property Companies?

How Does the Market for Corporate Control Function for Property Companies?

Internal and External Governance Mechanisms: Their Impact on the Performance of Large UK Public Companies

Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: The Role of Transparency &amp; Disclosure in Banking Sector of Pakistan

Contact Info

Product

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About

Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: The Role of Transparency & Disclosure in Banking Sector of Pakistan