2016
DOI: 10.1007/s10551-016-3188-5
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Corporate Governance Systems Diversity: A Coasian Perspective on Stakeholder Rights

Abstract: We examine corporate governance diversity within a Coasian framework of stakeholder rights, where the central role of governance is to ensure that necessary firm-specific investments are made. This Coasian perspective on stakeholder theory offers a unifying framework towards a global theory of comparative corporate governance, bridging the gap between economic theories of the firm and stakeholder theory, also offering an economicsbased alternative to agency theory that explicitly accounts for stakeholder right… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(15 citation statements)
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References 94 publications
(139 reference statements)
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“…Bank-based economies such as Japan, France, and Germany have a unique corporate governance environment that is distinguishable from the model used in capital market economies (Dore 2005;Jackson and Moerke 2005;Köke 2004). The adoption of a stakeholder approach to corporate governance in these economies ensures that the interest of all stakeholders is protected (Feils et al 2018). Unlike in the shareholder-oriented CG model, where an arms-length relationship is assumed between firms and their lenders, banks play an active role in firms' financing and managing agency conflict.…”
Section: Institutional Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bank-based economies such as Japan, France, and Germany have a unique corporate governance environment that is distinguishable from the model used in capital market economies (Dore 2005;Jackson and Moerke 2005;Köke 2004). The adoption of a stakeholder approach to corporate governance in these economies ensures that the interest of all stakeholders is protected (Feils et al 2018). Unlike in the shareholder-oriented CG model, where an arms-length relationship is assumed between firms and their lenders, banks play an active role in firms' financing and managing agency conflict.…”
Section: Institutional Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Stout (2012) also argues that maximizing shareholder value is a managerial choice, not a legal requirement, that can have adverse long‐term effects on firms and society. Indeed, recent literature has been increasingly questioning the “shareholder primacy” view (see, e.g., Zingales 2008; Blair and Stout 1999; Feils et al 2018). Our findings add to this line of literature by showing that maximizing shareholder value does not necessarily maximize firm value.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Shareholder empowerment is clearly a mechanism that adheres to the notion of “shareholder primacy.” There is, nevertheless, a growing literature that challenges this view. For example, Zingales (2008), Blair and Stout (1999), and Feils et al (2018) argue that allocating residual control rights to shareholders can deter firm‐specific investments by other stakeholders. As a result, maximizing shareholder value can have adverse long‐term effects on firm performance and society (see also Stout 2007, 2012).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, this study contributes to the stakeholder research by examining how legal bonds and operational linkages, as diverse types of formal mechanisms for bonding stakeholders, may affect collaborative stakeholder engagements in NPD (e.g. Feils, Rahman, & Sabac, 2018). Operational linkages are important to consider because they enable vertically linked stakeholders to engage in more-integrated interorganizational routines and systems, and may be more effective in enhancing the costs of partner opportunism (Cannon & Perreault, 1999;Karatzas et al, 2016).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%