Corporate Hedging, Stakeholderinteresse und Shareholder Value

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Hedging von Unternehmensrisiken ("Corporate Hedging") wird in Zeiten von zunehmender Internationalisierung und volatileren Märkten vielfach als eine Grundaufgabe moderner Unternehmenssteuerung angesehen. Dabei wird Hedging meistens aus der Generalprämisse risikoaverser Wirtschaftssubjekte oder einem natürlichen Schutzbedürfnis ungenügend diversifizierter Stakeholder, seltener aus Sicht der Shareholder heraus begründet. Andererseits werden wohldiversifizierte und risikofreudige Shareholder eher gegen Hedging optieren. Der Beitrag problematisiert diesen im Schrifttum wenig beachteten Widerspruch, nimmt eine Klassifizierung verbreiteter Hedgingmodelle vor und geht insbesondere auf deren Eignung zur Erklärung von Hedging im Shareholder Value-Kontext ein. In der Literatur wird ein Hedgingmotiv von Shareholdern verbreitet aus exogenen Friktionen -wie bspw. der Vermeidung von Insolvenzkosten -abgeleitet und dabei auf plausibilistische Risikomaße, wie etwa die Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit zurück-gegriffen. Der Beitrag nimmt hier eine entscheidungstheoretische Identifikation des kontextadäquaten Risikomaßes nach Rothschild und Stiglitz vor und rekapituliert auf dieser Basis die verschiedenen Literaturauffassungen zum Hedging im Shareholder Value-Kontext. Dabei erweisen sich die dort genannten Hedgingfunktionen als wenig tragfähig; nach Einbeziehung der Stakeholderposition kann über Hedging nicht mehr isoliert unter Risikogesichtspunkten, sondern muss im Lichte von Risk-Return-Trade-offs diskutiert werden. Schlüsselwörter Corporate Hedging · Shareholder Value · Stakeholder · Risikomaße W. Kürsten (B) Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Lehrstuhl für Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Finanzierung, Banken und Risikomanagement, AbstractCorporate hedging is commonly viewed as a fundamental task in modern corporate management, especially since markets have become increasingly volatile in the past and most firms have started operating internationally. In the literature, hedging is justified by the assumption of risk-averse decision makers or undiversified stakeholders, but mostly not from the point of view of risk-prone shareholders. This gap in the scientific discussion of corporate hedging is analyzed in the article, which provides a classification of hedging models and discusses their ability to explain corporate hedging from the shareholder's point of view. In particular, the well-known argument of increasing shareholder value by decreasing the value of external stakeholder claims through hedging is discussed analytically. The paper shows that Rothschild and Stiglitz's mean preserving spread is the only adequate risk measure in the context of shareholder value and hedging, but renders no robust hedging motive. As a result, the predictions from the literature rely on the use of inadequate risk measures and negligence with regard to the incorporation of risk-return trade-offs.

What do we really know about corporate hedging? A meta-analytical study

“…These theories especially gain in importance due to the increasing volatility in financial markets, in particular foreign exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity prices, which drive a firm's market value to the extent to which it depends on the development of these risk factors (Rawls and Smithson 1990). Following previous literature (e.g., Aretz and Bartram 2010;Arnold et al 2014;Guay and Kothari 2003;Kürsten 2006), the theoretical hypotheses can be subsumed under the maximization of shareholder value. Within the shareholder value maximization theory, we review four hypotheses that explain how corporate hedging increases firm value by (1) reducing the corporate tax burden, (2) lowering bankruptcy and financial distress costs, (3) mitigating asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity, as well as (4) improving the coordination of financing and investment policy and alleviating agency conflicts of debt.…”

“…The regional distribution of the collected 12 If studies use an identical sample of firms, we use each proxy variable from this sample only once. Beside the studies from Bartram (Bartram et al 2009;Bartram et al 2011;Bartram Bartram 2015) and , the studies from Nguyen and Faff (Nguyen and Faff 2002, 2006 are based on the same data sample. As the studies by Nguyen and Faff additionally investigate similar variables, we had to exclude Nguyen and Faff (2006) and Nguyen and Faff (2010) from our sample.…”

Cost of capital and probability of default in value-based risk management

“…The assumption of a perfect capital market would clearly obviate the need for risk management, as it would not be able to contribute positively to enterprise value (Kürsten, 2006, on the theoretical principles). The instruments deployed would mean that the transfer of risk (e.g.…”

“…by purchasing options on commodity prices) would incur costs that would precisely offset the benefits of risk reduction in such a market. The importance of risk management is only made clear in the reality of many market imperfections (Kürsten, 2006; Stier, 2017, with a reference to institutional and industrial economics), which also make enterprise-specific risks relevant to valuation (Froot et al , 1993). Entrepreneurs in small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular, who tend to invest much of their assets into their own enterprise, clearly gain an advantage by taking enterprise-specific risks into consideration (Kerins et al , 2004; Torous and Brennan, 1999).…”

“…4. Kürsten (2006) emphasizes here that in a perfect capital market, corporate value cannot be raised through by hedging.…”