2006
DOI: 10.1016/s0895-9935(06)15007-x
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Corporate Political Action and Global Trade Regimes: Fortune 500 Firms in the U.S. Trade Policy Formation Process

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(4 citation statements)
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“…37 Somewhat surprisingly, however, market sector was not associated with a significant change in any of the saturated equations. While other research on firm-level participation in trade policy activism reveals a significant difference in mean affiliation (i.e., the intercepts) across two-digit sector classifications (Darves and Dreiling 2007), sector does not appear to exert a comparable effect on political unity of paired firms. This finding suggests that while sector influences the odds that a given firm will engage in trade policy formation and advocacy, other factors are more important to the structure of the relational networks created when two or more firms collectively engage in trade policy advocacy.…”
Section: Corporate Trade Activism In the Legislature: Shared Congressmentioning
confidence: 56%
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“…37 Somewhat surprisingly, however, market sector was not associated with a significant change in any of the saturated equations. While other research on firm-level participation in trade policy activism reveals a significant difference in mean affiliation (i.e., the intercepts) across two-digit sector classifications (Darves and Dreiling 2007), sector does not appear to exert a comparable effect on political unity of paired firms. This finding suggests that while sector influences the odds that a given firm will engage in trade policy formation and advocacy, other factors are more important to the structure of the relational networks created when two or more firms collectively engage in trade policy advocacy.…”
Section: Corporate Trade Activism In the Legislature: Shared Congressmentioning
confidence: 56%
“…Likewise, several studies suggest that firms that coordinate their lobbying activities in the trade policy arena also make greater than average PAC contributions (Woodall et al 2000;Darves and Dreiling 2007). While it is conceivable that firms with larger than average PAC donations could also oppose one another on trade policy, recent research suggests that firms with larger PAC donations are more likely to be active in the major sites of business political coordination, such as the BR (Darves and Dreiling 2007;Burris 2008).…”
Section: Organizational Interests and Corporate Political Actionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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