Corporate social responsibility and decision analysis in a supply chain through government subsidy

Liu, Yong; Quan, Bing-ting; Xu, Qian; Forrest, Jeffrey Yi‐Lin

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.10.121

Cited by 156 publications

(109 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Wu et al [56] studied the supply chain coordination problem with CSR investment, and compared and analyzed the impact of quantitative flexible contracts and wholesale price incentive contracts on the profits of member companies. Liu et al [57] studied the impact of government CSR incentive subsidies on supply chain decisions and CSR investment levels. In terms of charitable donations, Aaya et al [58] took product donations as an enterprise's CSR investment and analyzed the impact of the government's CSR subsidy on the two-stage supply chain decision-making.…”

Section: Corporate Social Responsibility (Csr) and Corporate Donationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models Considering Government Subsidy and Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

2020

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In addition to pursuing profits, more and more international enterprises are beginning to pay attention to environmental sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR). How to effectively encourage enterprises to undertake more CSR and maintain the sustainable development of society has become an urgent task for managers and researchers. Under this background, this paper considers the recycling of used products for environmental sustainability and takes into account profit donation as a CSR investment. Aiming at the decision-making of single-cycle closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a dominant retailer when considering government subsidies and CSR investment, and based on the Stackelberg Game analysis technology, we formulate three distinct donation (CSR investment) models; the centralized system’s donation model, the manufacturer’s donation model, and the retailer’s donation model, and by doing system comparisons and numerical examples to analyze the impact of government subsidy and CSR investment on new product pricing and waste product recovery from the perspectives of government, environment and CLSC system. The results show that government subsidy is not only conducive to expanding market demand and increasing waste recycling rates, but also to improving CSR investment levels. Under the two decentralized decision-making models, regardless of whether the dominant retailer makes CSR investment, she can always get more channel profits than the manufacturer. From the view of environmental, economic, and social perspectives, the manufacturer makes CSR investment a better choice, and at this time the government has the best effect of implementing subsidy. Finally, based on the principle of cost sharing, a CSR cost sharing contract which can realize the coordination of CLSC is designed to solve the channel conflict and optimize the decision-making. Counterintuitively, the dominant retailer can gain more profits when it bears more cost in the CSR cost sharing contract.

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Section: Corporate Social Responsibility (Csr) and Corporate Donationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models Considering Government Subsidy and Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

2020

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“…By substituting Equations (27), (28), and (30) into Equations (26) and (29), two differential equations can be obtained. According to the characteristics of differential equations, the expressions of functions V s r (T, G) and V s m (T, G) are respectively set as follows.…”

Section: Supply Chain Internal Cooperation Incentivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…They used the model to analyze the optimal decision-making with and without government subsidies. The results show that, compared with nongovernmental subsidies, a certain range of government subsidies can promote supply chain members to assume social responsibility, improve the overall performance and social welfare of the supply chain [26]. In prior studies, most scholars consider the incentive role of supply chain CSR in a unidirectional way, while in real life, most supply chains involve both internal and external cooperation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Incentive Decision for Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Lag Effect

Cheng

Huang

2020

Sustainability

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With the deepening of economic globalization and international division of labor, enterprises gradually turn to supply chain management methods that aiming at win-win cooperation. An enterprise’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviors will affect the interests of other enterprises in the supply chain through transmission, diffusion, amplification, feedback, etc. Therefore, scholars are currently focusing on helping supply chain enterprises to take social responsibility. This paper takes a two-echelon supply chain as an example, which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Considering the influence of lag effect on the performance level of corporate social responsibility, we discuss the optimal strategy of corporate social responsibility in supply chain under centralized and decentralized decision-making. Three incentive models are proposed to improve the implementation effect of decentralized supply chain decision. Study finds that, in real life, decentralized supply chain is more in line with the decision-making mode of supply chain participants, even though centralized decision-making has better operation effect. Under certain circumstances, the mixed contract, which is composed of advertising cooperation, cost sharing and revenue sharing, could lead to supply chain coordination. As an external stakeholder, the government’s subsidy plays a positive role in promoting the fulfillment of corporate social responsibility. Multi-subsidy performs better than single-subsidy. Although the time lag promotes the manufacturer’s social responsibility efforts and the retailer’s advertising, it somehow compromises overall profit of the supply chain. Therefore, manufacturers should try to reduce the lag effect to maintain the overall profitability of the supply chain.

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“…The government's objective function includes the influence of profits for each member, the social aspect, i.e., consumer surplus (CS), and the total amount of the subsidy provided by the government organization [67,68]. The CS is the area of the demand curve below a given price, which can be expressed as…”

Section: Optimal Decisions In Policy Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision

Nielsen

Majumder²,

Saha

2019

Applied Sciences

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The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome.

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Corporate social responsibility and decision analysis in a supply chain through government subsidy

Cited by 156 publications

References 33 publications

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models Considering Government Subsidy and Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models Considering Government Subsidy and Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

Incentive Decision for Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Lag Effect

Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision

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