Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

Cho, Sumi; Lee, Sang‐Ho; Hoang, Xoan

doi:10.1111/1467-8454.12164

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…15 See, among others, Wang and Chen (2011), Xu (2018), andCho et al (2019). 16 As we discussed after presenting Proposition 1, if κ 0 is close to zero, each private firm's profit can increase with n, regardless of κ.…”

Section: Free-entry Marketmentioning

confidence: 98%

Profit‐enhancing entries in mixed oligopolies

Haraguchi

Matsumura

2021

Southern Economic Journal

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Section: Free-entry Marketmentioning

confidence: 98%

Profit‐enhancing entries in mixed oligopolies

Haraguchi

Matsumura

2021

Southern Economic Journal

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“…L. F. S. Wang et al (2012) assume that the products in the market come from foreign firms, while Y. M. Chang et al (2014) assume that a domestic firm competes with a foreign firm in the market. Cho et al (2019) showed that the tariff rate under a foreign (domestic) firm's Stackelberg leadership is lowest when the degree of CSR is large (small).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cho et al. (2019) showed that the tariff rate under a foreign (domestic) firm's Stackelberg leadership is lowest when the degree of CSR is large (small).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate social responsibility and tariff policy in a differentiated mixed duopoly

Wang,

Wang

2024

Bulletin of Econ Res

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In this paper, we assume that the domestic public firm competes in the market with a foreign private firm that cares about consumer surplus and the domestic government imposes tariffs on foreign firm. We aim to analyze the influence of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) level of foreign firm on privatization and tariff policy. It shows that if the government implements a privatization policy for the domestic public firm, the optimal degree of privatization decreases in the CSR level of foreign firm. Under the optimal privatization policy, if the product differentiation is relatively small, the equilibrium tariff increases in the CSR level; if the product differentiation is relatively large, the equilibrium tariff decreases in the CSR level; if the product differentiation is moderate, the relationship between the equilibrium tariff and CSR level is an inverted U‐shape. We further consider the policy implications under sequential moves of firms.

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“…For example, Pal (1998) and Amir and De Feo (2007) extended the study to the case of a mixed oligopolistic market. Lu (2006) and Cho et al (2019) studied the case of international competition. Baťrcena-Ruiz (2007), Matsumura and Ogawa (2014), and Lee and Xu (2018) considered endogenous timing decisions under price competition.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of partial passive ownership in a successive endogenous timing game with R&D spillovers

Xu,

Zhang,

Lee

2023

Bulletin of Econ Res

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This study explores the effect of partial passive ownership (PPO) in a successive two‐round endogenous timing game wherein firms choose research and development (R&D) investments in the first round and then subsequently choose quantities in the second round. We show that each firm prefers to be a quantity leader independent of the timing of R&D decisions, but the welfare‐inferior Cournot competition is an equilibrium of an endogenous production timing game. Moreover, we discover that the equilibrium of an endogenous R&D timing game crucially depends on the PPO level and R&D spillovers rate, while the R&D timing coordination may not be socially desirable unless both are low or high. Our findings suggest that the R&D leadership position of a PPO holder can play an anticompetitive role in the coordination of R&D competition with higher R&D spillovers rates and PPO levels.

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Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

Cited by 12 publications

References 25 publications

Profit‐enhancing entries in mixed oligopolies

Profit‐enhancing entries in mixed oligopolies

Corporate social responsibility and tariff policy in a differentiated mixed duopoly

Effects of partial passive ownership in a successive endogenous timing game with R&D spillovers

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