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Non-Technical SummaryEstablished firms' difficulty to innovate has been discussed extensively among economists. In contrast to incumbent firms, industry entrants are often described to be more Our analysis is based on a sample of about 2,500 ventures in German manufacturing in the period 1993-2007. We find that CVs innovate more radically than a control group of independent ventures (IVs). The contribution of corporate ventures to radical innovations, however, significantly decreases with a more concentrated ownership structure. Ownership concentration increases the parents' incentive to monitor and control the ventures. The resulting lack of managerial discretion makes it difficult for the ventures to develop radical innovations. In conclusion, our findings signal the need to balance the control incentive, stemming from the incumbents' investment into corporate venturing, with the benefits from granting some independence to the ventures. We conclude with management advice on how a balance can be achieved.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
August 2010
AbstractEstablished firms often face significant obstacles to innovation. As a solution, it has been suggested to form corporate ventures. Based on a sample of corporate and independent ventures in German manufacturing, we show that corporate ventures are more innovative than the control group, i.e. the independent ventures. In particular, corporate ventures are more successful at developing radical innovations. This effect, however, decreases with the ventures' degree of ownership concentration. We conclude that corporate ventures with a high ownership concentration are more likely to be controlled and monitored by their corporate sponsors, resulting in less favorable conditions for radical innovation.