We study estimation and non-parametric identi…cation of preferences in two-sided matching markets using data from a single market with many agents. We consider a model in which preferences of each side of the market are vertical, utility is nontransferable and the observed matches are pairwise stable. We show that preferences are not identi…ed with data on one-to-one matches but are non-parametrically iden-ti…ed when data from many-to-one matches are observed. The additional empirical content in many-to-one matches is illustrated by comparing two simulated objective functions, one that does and the other that does not use information available in manyto-one matching. We also prove consistency of a method of moments estimator for a parametric model under a data generating process in which the size of the matching market increases, but data only on one market is observed. Since matches in a single market are interdependent, our proof of consistency cannot rely on observations of independent matches. Finally, we present Monte Carlo studies of a simulation based estimator.