Correction to: ‘Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review’

Takács, Károly; Gross, Jörg; Testori, Martina; Letina, Srebrenka; Kenny, Adam R; Wittek, Rafael

doi:10.1098/rstb.2021.0467

Cited by 2 publications

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“…Second, and relatedly, cooperation can be reinforced via indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner’s choice (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Roberts et al, 2021). Reputation can spread via gossip or observability and be sustained by social norms (e.g., stern judging; see Santos et al, 2018) and properties of social networks that afford ostracizing and selecting cooperative partners (Gallo & Yan, 2015; Giardini & Vilone, 2016; Okada, 2020; Takacs et al, 2021). Through gossip, for example, people can exchange information on the trustworthiness and cooperativeness of interaction partners.…”

Section: The Formation and Evolution Of Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization

Dreu

Gross

Romano

2023

Perspect Psychol Sci

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Humans operate in groups that are oftentimes nested in multilayered collectives such as work units within departments and companies, neighborhoods within cities, and regions within nation states. With psychological science mostly focusing on proximate reasons for individuals to join existing groups and how existing groups function, we still poorly understand why groups form ex nihilo, how groups evolve into complex multilayered social structures, and what explains fission–fusion dynamics. Here we address group formation and the evolution of social organization at both the proximate and ultimate level of analysis. Building on models of fitness interdependence and cooperation, we propose that socioecologies can create positive interdependencies among strangers and pave the way for the formation of stable coalitions and groups through reciprocity and reputation-based partner selection. Such groups are marked by in-group bounded, parochial cooperation together with an array of social institutions for managing the commons, allowing groups to scale in size and complexity while avoiding the breakdown of cooperation. Our analysis reveals how distinct group cultures can endogenously emerge from reciprocal cooperation, shows that social identification and group commitment are likely consequences rather than causes of group cooperation, and explains when intergroup relations gravitate toward peaceful coexistence, integration, or conflict.

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Section: The Formation and Evolution Of Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization

Dreu

Gross

Romano

2023

Perspect Psychol Sci

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“…Repeated interactions support the evolution of cooperation [12,13], but this mechanism, namely, direct reciprocity, combined with higher interaction frequencies with in-group members, can lead to the emergence of in-group favoritism [1]. Models of indirect reciprocity indicate that reputation supports cooperation [14][15][16], but rich reputation information on in-group members can support in-group favoritism [17]. Interactions within networks sustain cooperation [18,19], but this mechanism also supports in-group favoritism when tags are introduced that differentiate groups [20][21][22].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partner selection and evolution of out-group avoidance

Takesue

2024

Preprint

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The preferential treatment of in-group members is widely observed. This study examines this phenomenon in the domain of cooperation in social dilemmas using evolutionary agent-based models that consider the role of partner selection. The model considers a repeated prisoner's dilemma game, in which agents belong to one of two groups that are distinguished by the continuation probability of pair interactions. On the basis of the behavior in the last round and the group affiliation of the partner, each individual selects to cooperate, defect, or stop interactions and search for a different partner. The results of simulation demonstrated that agents adopt cooperative strategies, including tit-for-tat and out-for-tat, toward in-group members. By contrast, agents stop interactions immediately after pair formation without observing their partner's behavior when they are paired with an out-group individual. Higher continuation probability with in-group partners hinders interaction with out-group individuals. Our results imply the importance of avoidance in intergroup interactions in social dilemmas and might explain in-group favoritism without enmity toward out-groups.

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Correction to: ‘Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review’

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization

Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization

Partner selection and evolution of out-group avoidance

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