Correlated equilibria in homogeneous good Bertrand competition

Jann, Ole; Schottmüller, Christoph

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.01.005

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 11 publications

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“…Dastidar (2011b) demonstrates that, even if all sellers have subadditive costs, existence of Nash equilibrium is restored by introducing asymmetries in the cost functions. Jann and Schottmuller (2015) study the correlated equilibria of a homogeneous-good game with constant marginal costs and demonstrate that, with symmetric marginal costs, the only correlated equilibrium is the standard Bertrand paradox with both sellers setting prices equal to marginal cost. Amir and Evstigneev (2018) study a standard Bertrand game with sellers having symmetric and constant marginal costs.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characterization

Edwards

Routledge

2022

Int J Game Theory

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Since (Reny in Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999) a substantial body of research has considered what conditions are sufficient for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoffs. This work analyzes a general Bertrand game, with convex costs and an arbitrary sharing rule at price ties, in which tied payoffs may be greater than non-tied payoffs when both are positive. On this domain, necessary and sufficient conditions for (i) the existence of equilibrium (ii) the uniqueness of equilibrium are presented. The conditions are intuitively easy to understand and centre around the relationships between intervals of real numbers determined by the primitives of the model.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%