Correlates of rigorous and credible transnational governance: A cross‐sectoral analysis of best practice compliance in eco‐labeling

Abstract

The number of eco‐labeling schemes is rising dramatically, yet the rigor and credibility of such schemes remains uneven. Whereas some eco‐labeling organizations (ELOs) comply with best practice guidelines designed to increase the credibility of their standards through attention to good operating principles, such as transparency and impartiality, others do not. Within this article, I attempt to explain this variation through multivariate regression analysis of an original cross‐sectoral dataset of transnational ELO policies and practices. I find compelling evidence to suggest that ELOs with environmental non‐governmental organization (ENGO) partners, nonprofit structures, or broad transnational reach are most likely to comply with best practices. I also find that private ELOs are more likely to disregard best practices than public ones. Conversely, I find little evidence that levels of industry funding or sector‐specific competition dynamics affect best practice compliance. This study contributes new data, a new method of comparison, and new findings to the growing literature on transnational governance.

Transparency in transnational governance: The determinants of information disclosure of voluntary sustainability programs

“…Interestingly, NGO involvement does not have the same effect. Our data does not point to a statistically significant relationship between NGO involvement and greater transparency (Grigorescu 2007;Abbott & Snidal 2009a;van der Ven 2015). Various explanations are possible for the absence of an "NGO effect."…”

“…Cashore et al described them as "one of the most innovative and startling institutional designs of the past 50 years" (2004, p. 298). Several authors have also drawn a direct connection between the inclusion of NGOs and transparency (Florini 2002;Grigorescu 2007;Gulbrandsen 2008;van der Ven 2015). On the one hand, they describe a "normative mechanism."…”

Private regulatory capture via harmonization: An analysis of global retailer regulatory intermediaries

“…1 In contrast, the commitment approach, developed and favored by many NGO-led PRIs, involves more rigorous standards, acquiring an indepth knowledge of conditions in factories through intensive factory monitoring, as well as significant engagement with local factories, unions, and NGOs. 2 The compliance approach is considered to be less stringent than the commitment approach, meaning that it is less comprehensive in terms of the number of issues covered and less prescriptive in terms of mandatory and substantive thresholds (Bernstein & Cashore 2007;Fransen & Burgoon 2011;van der Ven 2015). 3 However, as it shifts demands and costs from the buyers to the suppliers, it is generally favored by larger retailers who deal with large numbers of suppliers (Fransen 2011;Fransen & Burgoon 2011;Marques 2016;Sum 2010).…”

Beyond market, firm, and state: Mapping the ethics of global value chains

“…Some might perceive this as a conflict of interest, since the MSC stands to financially benefit from making its eco‐label more easily achievable and licensable. Others counter that there are procedural safeguards in place to prevent this from happening (van der Ven, ). In either case, there is some degree of incentive to create easily achievable standards and overlooking noncompliance issues in order to profit from certification and labeling activities (Cashore, Auld, Bernstein, & McDermott, ; Mayer & Gereffi, ).…”

“…These institutional precautions also generate beyond‐compliance norms, which demand a commitment to norms that are derived from their status as professional regulators, particularly in handling conflicts of interest and avoiding using such offices for private gain (Lewis & Gilman, ; Stark, ). Past research has shown that not all ELOs perform these tasks equally well (van der Ven, , ). The temptation to create superficial eco‐labeling standards may be greater in GVCs characterized by unilateral governance (van der Ven, ).…”