2015 IEEE 26th Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor, and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC) 2015
DOI: 10.1109/pimrc.2015.7343478
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Correlation-aware machine selection for M2M data gathering in cellular networks

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Cited by 2 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Since x * is mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, i.e., u K i,m (x * , t) ≤ j ′ ∈S u K i,mj ′ (t)x * j ′ , and based on (13)ū K i,m (x * , t) = j ′ ∈S u K i,mj ′ (t)x * j ′ , and thus, ∂ẋ * j (t) ∂x * m (t) < 0. Consequently, the convergence state of the proposed algorithm, and specifically the steady state of the replicator dynamic in (12) is asymptotically stable. Since steady state of the replicator dynamic is an asymptotically stable state in our problem, then the proposed Algorithm 1 will converge to ESS [39].…”
Section: B Proof Of Theoremmentioning
confidence: 92%
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“…Since x * is mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, i.e., u K i,m (x * , t) ≤ j ′ ∈S u K i,mj ′ (t)x * j ′ , and based on (13)ū K i,m (x * , t) = j ′ ∈S u K i,mj ′ (t)x * j ′ , and thus, ∂ẋ * j (t) ∂x * m (t) < 0. Consequently, the convergence state of the proposed algorithm, and specifically the steady state of the replicator dynamic in (12) is asymptotically stable. Since steady state of the replicator dynamic is an asymptotically stable state in our problem, then the proposed Algorithm 1 will converge to ESS [39].…”
Section: B Proof Of Theoremmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…The replicator dynamics in (12) capture the dynamics of distributed MTD clustering in our proposed algorithm. Algorithm 1 converges to percentages of various cluster sizes within the MTD population, and if so to which percentages [39].…”
Section: B Evolutionary Game Stability Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
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