Corruption and firm tax evasion

Alm, James; Martínez-Vázquez, Jorge; McClellan, Chandler

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.006

Cited by 174 publications

(143 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Moreover, higher bribes involve higher levels of evasion. These findings support the argument that tax compliance depends on the quality and honesty of tax authorities [9]. Some studies have highlighted how the corruption culture of a company, as well as the corruption average attitude of officials and executives of a company using their cultural information, falls on the corporate structure.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 75%

Corruption and ISO 37001: A new instrument to prevent it in international entrepreneurship

Brescia¹

2017

WJAFE

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 75%

Corruption and ISO 37001: A new instrument to prevent it in international entrepreneurship

Brescia¹

2017

WJAFE

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“…The converse is also true: in the absence of third-party tax information return reporting, tax compliance plummets. 13 11 See Alm and McClellan (2012), Alm and Shimshack (2014), and Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and McClellan (2016). 12 See the many studies listed on the IRS "tax gap" web site at https://www.irs.gov/uac/the-tax-gap.…”

Section: "To Increase Tax Compliance Increase Enforcement"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Economics Useful for Public Policy?

Alm

2017

Southern Economic Journal

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Economists have always played an important role in major public policy debates. Even so, I believe that the role of economists in these public policy discussions has often been misguided because it has typically relied upon “best practices,” stated in the form of “general guidelines” or even “universal principles.” However, “best practices” are not best if the specific situation does not conform with the assumptions that underlie the advice. So my first conclusion is a cautionary, and negative, one: Specific circumstances differ so profoundly across individuals, firms, markets, countries, and time that most any attempt to define “best practices” that apply in all circumstances will lead to profoundly misleading public policy recommendations. However, even if economics cannot identify “the” truth, it can often identify “a” truth. So my second conclusion is a more positive one: Economists should continue to develop multiple theories that inform public policies, but we should also focus our efforts on identifying and testing the critical assumptions that drive the results of these theories, recognizing that the validity of any assumptions will depend intimately on specific circumstances. I illustrate these two main conclusions with specific examples from my own work. I conclude with some “best practices” recommendations of my own, recognizing the obvious irony of such an effort.

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“…However, the perceived extent of corruption in tax departments varies across countries depending on the average dispersion of corruption. Alm et al (2016) focus on the impact of corrupt tax officials and tax payments by firms. They use data from the World Enterprise Survey and the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey to show that corruption payments-either voluntarily offered to or extorted by corrupt officials-significantly reduce reported sales and hence tax payments of firms.…”

Section: Corruption In Tax Departmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How does petty corruption affect tax morale in sub-Saharan Africa?: An empirical analysis

Jahnke

2017

WIDER Working Paper

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This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on 'The political economy of social protection 'The political economy of social protection systems', which is part of a larger research project on 'The economics and politics of taxation and social protection'. Abstract: Revenues from taxation gain importance to finance economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. Extortion of bribes by public officials can provide one obstacle for tax compliance. This paper uses micro-level data from the Afrobarometer to analyse how petty corruption erodes tax morale. A mediation analysis shows that petty corruption directly reduces tax morale but also diminishes trust in the tax department and hence indirectly affects tax morale. The effect on tax morale is more severe in countries and regions where fewer people are affected by petty corruption and becomes insignificant if extortion of bribes is particularly prevalent.

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Corruption and firm tax evasion

Cited by 174 publications

References 42 publications

Corruption and ISO 37001: A new instrument to prevent it in international entrepreneurship

Corruption and ISO 37001: A new instrument to prevent it in international entrepreneurship

Is Economics Useful for Public Policy?

How does petty corruption affect tax morale in sub-Saharan Africa?: An empirical analysis

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