Corruption and paradoxes in alliances

Nieva, Ricardo

doi:10.1007/s10101-018-0213-4

Cited by 4 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…We contribute to the former as we have used Nieva's (2019) productivity-bargaining approach to study the formation of ruling coalitions that implement institutions. In contrast, different types of threats to these have been considered simultaneously, in particular, those from heterogeneous coalitions and not just "the disenfranchised."…”

Section: Review and Discussion Of The Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions

Nieva

2021

Rationality and Society

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We have explained the presence of heterogeneous winning coalitions in social revolutions. In an overcrowded agrarian society, two almost identical non-productive enforcers, the landed political elite, collude and bargain over transfers with one of the two peasants to contest over a piece of land, as property rights for land are not well defined. In any other scenario, neither the grand coalition nor the coalition of two peasants and one enforcer forms, thereby deposing the other enforcer with positive probability. So, social revolutions never occur. If foreign wars weaken an enforcer, such as in China (1911), France, and Russia, adding one unit of capital makes the coalition of the peasant, the now worker, and one of the enforcers (now an industrial political elite) attractive: The excess labor can work with it; the weaker enforcer retaliates less and the stronger one more, if excluded. However, if the weaker one (the still-landed political elite) proposes first, a grand coalition forms in which he or she gets less than the other members do (desertion). There is conflict among peasants and among landed elites; thus, the concept of a coalition is more appropriate than that of a class.

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Section: Review and Discussion Of The Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is then natural to have an "underlying" model with endogenous institutions. For this purpose, we have endogenized the property rights of the factors of production by using a simple extension of Nieva (2003Nieva ( , 2019 and then used a coalitional bargaining game, as in Ray (2007), for institutions are changed by coalitions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions

Nieva

2021

Rationality and Society

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“…Hence, it is important to study this e¤ectiveness in the presence of such an enforcer as for its implications, in particular, for corruption, con ‡ict and inequality. 2 In order to do that, we extend both Nieva (2019) and Nitzan and Ueda (2018). In the latter paper, several groups compete for a prize.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We study the case where marginal e¤ort cost exhibits constant elasticity. 3 If prize valuations are homogeneous, the …rst-best cost sharing rule is implemented, full sharing of the cost, if such an enforcer, that induces heterogeneity, is a member of the group; this is di¤erent than the result in Nieva (2019) and Nitzan and Ueda (2018); further, the group probability of winning goes up if such an enforcer is introduced following the former author as his analysis can be used with corner solutions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Tragic Solution to the Collective Action Problem: Implications for Corruption, Conflict and Inequality

Nieva

2020

SSRN Journal

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We study the role of an enforcer in the effectiveness of selective incentives in solving the collective action problem when groups take part in a contest. Cost functions exhibit constant elasticity of marginal effort costs. If prize valuations are homogeneous, our source of heterogeneity induces full cost-sharing and the first-best individual contributions; further, the group probability of winning goes up. With heterogeneity in prize valuations, an increase in the effectiveness of the enforcer in conflict increases the group probability of winning only if the prize valuation of the enforcer is lower than de Lehmer mean of those of the other players; however, the induced partial cost sharing is not group efficient. If effectiveness "tends to infinity", the collective action problem is solved with partial cost-sharing if that prize valuation is not too low. Tragically, if productivity is low (if the prize is private in our set up) this occurs with corrupt coalitions which have been shown to form together with conflict and inequality endogenously; otherwise, this occurs with non corrupt coalitions. Further, even if such valuation is too low the group winning probability goes up. In this latter case, over costsharing yields group efficiency.

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Political machines and the curse of public resources in subnational democracies

Cendales

Garza

Arcila

2021

JES

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PurposeThis paper argues that decentralization reforms in Colombia, implemented since the 1980s, have led to the decentralization of political clientelism rather than its demise. Clientelism is a system of political and economic institutions that turns every local democracy into an extractive political institution. The authors theoretically demonstrate that an increase in public resources will increase corruption.Design/methodology/approachThe authors develop and test a subnational public choice model, where clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration constitute a stable long-term institutional equilibrium. The model comprises two linked subgames: electoral tournament and corruption in public policy. The model makes two predictions that currently oppose predominant approaches: (1) increasing the severity of jail sentences to electoral crimes increases their price and the predominance of machine politics, instead of improving the quality of electoral tournaments and (2) increasing local governments' public finance increases clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration.FindingsThe authors find evidence in favor of the theoretical model of curse of public resources, using difference-in-differences estimation with a database 2016–17 of Colombia's 1,034 municipalities. This country is well-suited for our analysis because it has a long-term commitment to formal democratic processes (since 1958), while plagued by endemic corruption and clientelism problems.Originality/value(1) The theoretical approach is innovative and disruptive of current models on the problem, (2) the model builds upon the Colombian situation, a country with prominent corruption and political violence problems regardless of its relatively long-term commitment with free elections (since 1958) and (3) the theoretical discussion is tested using a comprehensive set of difference-in-differences estimations.

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Corruption and paradoxes in alliances

Cited by 4 publications

References 34 publications

Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions

Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions

A Tragic Solution to the Collective Action Problem: Implications for Corruption, Conflict and Inequality

Political machines and the curse of public resources in subnational democracies

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