Corruption and positive selection in privatization

Buia, Raluca Elena; Molinari, Maria Cristina

doi:10.1016/j.rie.2012.05.002

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Similarly, Rose-Ackerman ( 2007) suggests that the level and incidence of corruption in private sectors were positively associated with a firm's contact with the public sector for such matters as foreign trade, tax collection and regulatory compliance. Meanwhile, Buia and Molinari (2012) suggest that the privatization process is an opportunity for public servants to obtain bribes where the corporation can pay off officials to decide whether to sell state-owned enterprises at what price and to whom. Correspondingly, Bjorvatn and Søreide (2005) state that corruption may be a particularly severe problem in the sale of public assets because it is typically complicated to value these assets.…”

Section: Corruption In the Private Sectormentioning

confidence: 99%

The supply-side of corruption: a review of scenario, causes and prevention measure

Mahmud

Mohamed

Arshad

2021

JFC

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Purpose This paper aims to provide a proper understanding of corruption in the private sector, also known as the supply-side of corruption. It also presents the causes of corrupt practices and points out the corporations’ actions to mitigate corrupt behaviour in the business environment. Design/methodology/approach This study reviews the prior literature on the phenomenon of corruption in the private sector, its causes and the preventive measures that should be implemented. Findings Corruption in the private sector was associated with a firm’s interaction with the public sector, and the most common corruption in the private sector is grand corruption, which is improper contribution made to high-level public officials and politicians. The causes of corruption in the private sector can be explained from several dimensions: economy, psychosocial and legal and regulation. Preventative measures encompass both internal strategies, which are endogenous to business and external strategies like exogenous legislation and restrictions enforced by the government or outside organizations. Originality/value The efficient strategies in combating corruption need active cooperation and participation from the supply-side of corruption. Thus, this study contributes to the literature on the theoretical understanding of the corruption problem from the supply-side and responsibility play by the private sector in global anti-corruption initiatives.

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Section: Corruption In the Private Sectormentioning

confidence: 99%

The supply-side of corruption: a review of scenario, causes and prevention measure

Mahmud

Mohamed

Arshad

2021

JFC

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“…The effect of corruption for public welfare has always been an interesting theme for economists (Bardhan, 1997;Jain, 2001). Corruption positively increases agglomeration of industries in India, and has a favorable effect for private firms only when the efficiency of private players is higher than that of the average public bureaucrat (Buia & Molinari, 2012). Other studies showed that India generally has a moderate to large problem with corruption as a whole country (Quah, 2008).…”

Section: Hypothesis H6 Corruption and Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Industrial Agglomeration and Location Choice in the Service and Retail Sector: The Case of India

Singh¹,

Gál²

2018

DETUROPE

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Behind the selection of location choices for services and retail sector, many factors work in conjunction. This research tried to determine which factors had an influence on location choice and agglomeration and which factors worked together to decide the location choice. This study empirically tests location determinant hypothesis. Our findings suggested that infrastructure, corruption and law, labour law and workforce had a significant effect on location choice. Other factors such as trade regulation, competition, sales and supply, access to land and permit, access to finance, institutional administration and political constraint had the insignificant effect on location choice. Our research used the 2014 World Enterprise Survey data from World Bank, and it included the 2116 registered companies sample responses.

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“…In particular, the Government, by setting T, can indirectly make a (positive) selection on the type of private manager even if he cannot observe the value of σ P : since less efficient private managers are less willing to pay to get the facility, any strictly positive transfer will exclude less efficient managers (Buia and Molinari 2012).…”

Section: Asymmetric Information and The Selection Effect Of Pricesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Second Best Theory of Institutional Quality

Molinari

2013

Public Organiz Rev

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This paper illustrates a theory of the second best where the constraints to the achievement of the optimum are of institutional nature. We consider the effects of corruption and bad governance on the public decision to privatize the provision of a service when contracts are incomplete and there is asymmetric information. We show that both corruption and bad governance are detrimental to welfare, but that removing only one of the two is not necessarily beneficial if the other is still present. The theory supplies a possible explanation to the controversial empirical evidence on the economic effects of corruption.

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Corruption and positive selection in privatization

Cited by 5 publications

References 20 publications

The supply-side of corruption: a review of scenario, causes and prevention measure

The supply-side of corruption: a review of scenario, causes and prevention measure

Industrial Agglomeration and Location Choice in the Service and Retail Sector: The Case of India

A Second Best Theory of Institutional Quality

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