Corruption and Private Law Enforcement: Theory and History

Garoupa, Nuno; Klerman, Daniel M.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1416958

“…14 Garoupa (1997a) also discusses for-profit private enforcement and the distorted incentives it leads to. Besides, there are many studies assuming enforcers being corruptible, such as Mookherjee and Png (1995), Polinsky and Shavell (2001), Mishra (2002), Klerman (2010), andHiriart et al (2010). 15 In contrast, our paper focuses on the two-enforcer case, because we think that it is more illustrative and appropriate than the conventional competitive case of private law enforcement.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

When is duplication of effort a good thing in law enforcement?

Liu

¹

,

Wang

²

,

Yin

³

2022

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many studies find that public law enforcers have self‐interested reasons to maximize financial recoveries. We analyze a principal‐agent model where a social‐welfare‐maximizing government needs to motivate self‐interested law enforcers to exert enforcement effort to detect offending firms, assuming that a firm's harmful act brings a private gain to himself and a harm to the society. We find that the competitive system with effort duplication dominates that without duplication when the social harm caused by an act is sufficiently large. Our paper thus provides a rationale for the existence of multiple‐enforcer systems with effort duplications in the real world when enforcers are (fully or partially) self‐interested.

show abstract

“…For that, it is argued that non-governmental institutions have fewer bureaucratic obstacles in execution, in addition to being financed with private resources, thus not burdening the public budget (Burbank, Farhang, & Kritzer, 2013). In addition, the private enforcement system could submit to competition, and thus be less susceptible to regulatory capture (Garoupa & Klerman, 2010). This private enforcement can be performed by independent private entities, such as arbitration chambers, certification bodies, and unions (Hay & Shleifer, 1998).…”

Section: Enforcement Typologiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anti-Corruption Enforcement and Organizations: A Narrative Review

Soares

¹

,

Filho

²

2021

Rev. adm. contemp.

0

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Context: in the administration literature, it is possible to identify several occurrences of the term enforcement, mainly related to studies of corruption. These mentions, however, are not uniform and often refer to different types of the phenomenon. In addition, they occur without connection to regulation studies, in which enforcement is a central concept. Objective: the objective of the present study is to identify the types of anti-corruption enforcement present in the administration literature in the light of the regulatory literature. Methods: we carried out a reflective thematic analysis on 31 articles in the administration area, selected in the Web of Knowledge database and published until 2017, in which corruption and enforcement appear in a related way. Results: at the end of the analysis, it was possible to identify four types of occurrence of the term in the literature: punitive, market, competitive, and cultural enforcement. These four types have unique characteristics in the light of the regulatory literature. Conclusions: the identification of types of anti-corruption enforcement contributes to differentiate the many ways in which the term is used in the literature. Furthermore, as a study of a typological nature, it offers a way to develop new theories, as well as to carry out empirical studies.

show abstract

“…Para tanto, alega-se que instituições não governamentais apresentam menos entraves burocráticos na execução, além de que são financiadas com recursos privados, portanto, não onerando o orçamento público (Burbank, Farhang, & Kritzer, 2013). Além disso, o sistema privado de enforcement poderia submeter-se à competição, e dessa forma ser menos suscetível à captura regulatória (Garoupa & Klerman, 2010).…”

Section: Tipologias De Enforcementunclassified

Enforcement Anticorrupção e Organizações: Uma Revisão Narrativa

Soares

¹

,

Filho

²

2021

Rev. adm. contemp.

0

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Context: in the administration literature, it is possible to identify several occurrences of the term enforcement, mainly related to studies of corruption. These mentions, however, are not uniform and often refer to different types of the phenomenon. In addition, they occur without connection to regulation studies, in which enforcement is a central concept. Objective: the objective of the present study is to identify the types of anti-corruption enforcement present in the administration literature in the light of the regulatory literature. Methods: we carried out a reflective thematic analysis on 31 articles in the administration area, selected in the Web of Knowledge database and published until 2017, in which corruption and enforcement appear in a related way. Results: at the end of the analysis, it was possible to identify four types of occurrence of the term in the literature: punitive, market, competitive, and cultural enforcement. These four types have unique characteristics in the light of the regulatory literature. Conclusions: the identification of types of anti-corruption enforcement contributes to differentiate the many ways in which the term is used in the literature. Furthermore, as a study of a typological nature, it offers a way to develop new theories, as well as to carry out empirical studies.

show abstract

Corruption and Private Law Enforcement: Theory and History

Cited by 3 publications

References 29 publications

When is duplication of effort a good thing in law enforcement?

When is duplication of effort a good thing in law enforcement?

Anti-Corruption Enforcement and Organizations: A Narrative Review

Enforcement Anticorrupção e Organizações: Uma Revisão Narrativa

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About