2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2019.09.002
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Corruption and re-election: how much can politicians steal before getting punished?

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Cited by 24 publications
(17 citation statements)
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References 38 publications
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“…Rundquist, Strom, and Peters (1977) have argued that voters were willing to condone corruption if the accused candidate had a strong record on other dimensions. Specifically, corruption could be overlooked when a politician had similar ideological views or was able to provide valuable goods (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013), though this relationship may cease to work on higher levels of corruption (Vuković 2020). Several studies have indeed found that corrupt candidates faced fewer electoral consequences among co-partisans either because the latter do not believe the accusations or choose to ignore them (Eggers 2014;Franchino and Zucchini 2015), a direct extrapolation of the literature on the partisan bias in political perceptions (Bartels 2002).…”
Section: Corruption War Veterans and Voter Preferencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rundquist, Strom, and Peters (1977) have argued that voters were willing to condone corruption if the accused candidate had a strong record on other dimensions. Specifically, corruption could be overlooked when a politician had similar ideological views or was able to provide valuable goods (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013), though this relationship may cease to work on higher levels of corruption (Vuković 2020). Several studies have indeed found that corrupt candidates faced fewer electoral consequences among co-partisans either because the latter do not believe the accusations or choose to ignore them (Eggers 2014;Franchino and Zucchini 2015), a direct extrapolation of the literature on the partisan bias in political perceptions (Bartels 2002).…”
Section: Corruption War Veterans and Voter Preferencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(11) To account for the facts that our research setting is in Croatia which has been characterized as a country where politicians use public procurement contracts to reward their cronies (Vuković, 2020), as well as that public funds can legitimately be used to provide firms with cushions in difficult times (Srhoj et al, 2020;Stojčić et al, 2020) we match on lagged dummy variables for whether the firm received a public procurement contract from the state or a state-owned enterprise in each of the past three years as well as the share of value received from the government in its total revenue in the most recent year before PBS.…”
Section: Matchingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Deficiencies in personnel training are the result of training specialists without taking into account competencies in the field of organizing personnel work to combat corruption [15]; shortcomings in retraining, untimely passing of advanced training, as well as frequent changes in legislation.…”
Section: Research Questionsmentioning
confidence: 99%