Corruption as a Self-Reinforcing Trap: Implications for Reform Strategy

Abstract

Corruption is widely believed to be a self-reinforcing phenomenon, in the sense that the incentive to engage in corrupt acts increases as corruption becomes more widespread. Some argue that corruption's self-reinforcing property necessarily implies that incremental anticorruption reforms cannot be effective, and that the only way to escape a high-corruption equilibrium “trap” is through a so-called “big bang” or “big push.” However, corruption's self-reinforcing property does not logically entail the necessity of a big bang approach to reform. Indeed, corruption's self-reinforcing property may strengthen the case for pursuing sustained, cumulative incremental reforms. While there may be other reasons to prefer a big bang approach to an incremental approach, this conclusion cannot be grounded solely or primarily on corruption's self-reinforcing character.

Social norms of corruption in the field: social nudges on posters can help to reduce bribery

“…We discuss the findings in light of their relevance for theory and policy on the social norms of corruption. From a theoretical perspective, the results support a 'corruption trap' view (Stephenson, 2018). For one, our results show that people perceived bribery as commonplace.…”

“…However, in a context where bribery is commonplace (= high-corruption equilibrium), paying bribes represents the ‘best choice’ to get ahead. Here, corruption is theorized to be a social trap – meaning that once corruption has become systemic, it tends to reinforce itself (Stephenson, 2018). One major reason for this stems from the fact that legal enforcement institutions themselves fall prey to the high levels of corruption (Persson et al , 2012).…”

“…The injunctive element conveys what is considered as acceptable, while the descriptive element refers to what is considered as common (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). Recent theories on corruption highlight the descriptive element of social norms as a crucial predictor of corrupt behaviour (Rothstein, 2011; Marquette & Peiffer, 2015; Stephenson, 2018). For example, current theories on corruption suggest that people in high-corruption contexts often engage in petty forms of corruption because they believe that others around them do so too – even though they themselves might consider it wrong and unacceptable (Rothstein, 2000).…”

Theoretical and Game Modeling of Corrupt Behavior at the Customs

“…При этом в действительности на поведение агентов оказывают сильное влияние культурные и социальные нормы, принятые в обществе. В частности, если в некоторый момент времени все вокруг берут взятки, в следующий -взятки будут брать даже больше вне контекста максимизации функции полезности [22]. Тем не менее, начнём с первого подхода.…”

Corruption Bias and Information: A Study in the Lab

“…We wish to test whether, although anonymous and without consequences in terms of punishment, spreading the information about an attempt of corruption may affect both people's corruption beliefs, and therefore the perceived social norm, and their choices. 6 The direction of this potential effect on the willingness to corrupt depends on which behavioural mechanism prevails: spreading news about bribery attempts might either deteriorate the social norm and reinforce one's willingness to bribe or reduce it because of the stigma associated to information diffusion (see Stephenson, 2020, for a description of the 'reduction of shame' and 'stigma' mechanisms in corruption).…”