Corruption, investments and contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence from rural Liberia

Beekman, Gonne; Bulte, Erwin; Nillesen, Eleonora

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.04.004

Cited by 97 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…The results of the laboratory experiment conform to field study observations. Beekman et al (2014) showed that public good giving in rural Nigeria is less in areas that experience more corruption by political leaders. Thus, follower's matching strategy depends on their beliefs about the actions of the leaders.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership and motivation for public goods contributions

McCannon

2017

Scottish J Political Eco

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Results from a leader-follower public goods game are presented. An individual, when randomly selected to make a contribution knowing others will observe the selection, gives more than in the simultaneous-move public goods game. Followers adopt a quasi-matching strategy where they systematically donate less than the leader, but contribute more when the leader does and contribute less when the leader free rides. The net result is increased provision of a public good when contributions are sequential. The results highlight that psychological preferences, rather than solely social preferences, can explain behavior.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership and motivation for public goods contributions

McCannon

2017

Scottish J Political Eco

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“…It includes the percent contribution to the public good in terms of the initial endowment (20 ECU) for each of the corruption groups. High- Beekman et al (2013Beekman et al ( , 2014. There are no statistically significant differences between the control group and the low-corruption group.…”

Section: Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 77%

“…Using a natural experiment with rural households in Liberia, Beekman et al (2014) relate the impact of corruption on the degree to which people cooperate. Their study considers as a measure of corruption the amount of in-kind transfers lost in 2 days under the watch of local leaders, and uses it to create an index of leaders showing the most and least corrupt.…”

Section: Contribution To the Studies Of Corruption And Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does corruption affect cooperation? A laboratory experiment

Campos-Vázquez

Mejía

2016

Lat Am Econ Rev

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In this paper, we analyze the nature of cooperation in different corruption regimes. In a laboratory experiment with university students in Mexico, individuals play first a corruption game and then a public goods game. The corruption game is divided into three groups: high-and low-monitoring scenarios as well as a control group not exposed to the game. The public goods game is divided into three groups: the standard game, a game with centralized punishment executed by an exogenously assigned leader, and a game similar to the second one, but adding the possibility of counter-punishment. There are four key results. First, there is more corruption in the low-monitoring group. Second, in the public goods game there is less cooperation in the low-monitoring group than in the group with more intensive monitoring. Third, the option of punishment increases cooperation, but the sensitivity to punishment is greater in the high-monitoring (low-corruption) group. Fourth, the option of counter-punishment of the leader decreases cooperation. Our results highlight the importance of corruption in decreasing trust and social capital and show the difficulty of promoting cooperation when corruption is prevalent.

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“…Corruption can be defined as "the misuse of public office for private gain" (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000, p. 32;Beekman et al, 2011). Corruption involves real costs: worldwide, bribery has been estimated to cost $1 trillion per year, or 3 percent of global income (Rose- Ackerman, 2004).…”

Section: Corruption and Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Road to Good Governance: Via the Path Less Accountable? The Effectiveness of Fiscal Accountability in Liberia

Krawczyk

Sweet-Cushman

Muhula

2013

International Journal of Public Administration

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Accountability mechanisms are touted as a path to "good governance." But are accountability mechanisms a sure route to achieving the objectives of "good governance"? Limited case studies have offered inconsistent evidence (Blair, 2000;Charlick, 2001;Devas & Grant, 2003). But empirical evidence of the relationships among principles of good governance-high citizen participation, low levels of corruption, high-quality service delivery-and accountability mechanisms is lacking. We examine the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms in Liberia and find relationships between measures of county level fiscal accountability and measures of good governance do not always produce expected results, making fiscal accountability mechanisms no guarantee for achieving goals of good governance.

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Corruption, investments and contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence from rural Liberia

Cited by 97 publications

References 48 publications

Leadership and motivation for public goods contributions

Leadership and motivation for public goods contributions

Does corruption affect cooperation? A laboratory experiment

The Road to Good Governance: Via the Path Less Accountable? The Effectiveness of Fiscal Accountability in Liberia

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