Corruption, the Southern African Development Community Anti-corruption Protocol and the principal–agent–client model

Abstract

Since the 1990s, a number of anti-corruption conventions have been adopted due to pressure from international financial institutions, donor countries and governments of major industrialised nations. One of these conventions is the Anti-corruption Protocol adopted by the Southern African Development Community. This article examines this Convention against the backdrop of the principal-agent-client (PAC) model which influences much of the current anti-corruption measures ranging from legal and civil service reform through to privatisation of the public sector. In focusing on the efforts to fight and prevent corruption through legal and public sector reform, this paper highlights the limitations of externally imposed solutions largely driven by donors. Using Tanzania, a country that has seen extensive technical input from donor agencies in reforming the law and bureaucratic structures, as an illustration, this article argues that the limited success of such donor-driven anti-corruption strategies is attributable to a number of reasons ranging from reform policies of donors and paternalistic attitudes to political shifts and antipathy towards external demands for reforms that are fuelled by the colonial past. This paper recommends that for a recipient country to take ownership of the anti-corruption strategies it is important to tailor the PAC model to the cultural, social and political context of the recipient country so that the solutions are seen as an indigenous initiative, thus enabling sustainable change in attitudes and behaviour.

The calculus of corruption: a paradox of ‘strong’ corruption amidst ‘strong’ systems and institutions in developing administrative systems

“…The definition in the preceding texts is corroborated by a classical illustration by Klitgaard () who explains a widely accepted model (the principal–agent–client model), which argues that corruption thrives where the principal grants authority to an agent to deliver services to the client; however, the agent ends up letting the principal down and tends to abuse the client by obtaining unapproved benefits before providing these services. The conditions for corruption present themselves the agent (A), who is the trustee and wields much power and discretion in administering the services without adequate accountability (Klitgaard, ; see also Carr, ).…”

Fluidity of Regulation-CSR Nexus: The Multinational Corporate Corruption Example

“…This was followed in 2003 by the legally binding United Nations Convention against Corruption (Carr, 2006;Webb, 2005 (Carr, 2007(Carr, , 2009). This account demonstrates apparent universalism of regulatory approach, albeit in the sense of regulation as rule or standard setting.…”

The Dark Side of Cooperation: International Organizations and Member Corruption

“…Despite these rules, the SADC membership-and its headquarters-are riddled with allegations of corruption and standards are not being implemented. While a number of corruption cases are reported, few are prosecuted or result in consequences for the accused (Carr 2009). Most SADC members have shown little to no improvement in their corruption levels since the adoption of the Protocol; some have shown a clear decline in their rankings (Transparency International 2018).…”