Cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicts strategic choices in economic games

Yamagishi, Toshio; Takagishi, Haruto; Fermin, Alan de Souza Rodrigues; Kanai, Ryota; Li, Yang; Matsumoto, Yoshiharu

doi:10.1073/pnas.1523940113

Cited by 85 publications

(78 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…Dataset S1, which we used for analysis, included the same DLPFC and behavioral data that were used in an earlier study (30). This earlier study demonstrated a negative relationship between cortical thickness and prosocial giving behavior in a DG, but not in an UG, and suggested that deliberative scrutiny of the incentives of the DG, rather than reading the partner's responses in the UG, induces players with a thick DLPFC to behave in a selfish manner.…”

Section: Cognitive Intervention Reduces Prosocial Behavior When Decismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The gray matter thickness of the regions labeled as the middle frontal gyrus was extracted as the volume of the DLPFC. Gray matter thickness values were estimated for the DLPFC of both hemispheres that was the focus of analysis in the earlier study (30) using the FreeSurfer package (version 5.1.0 for Linux CentOS 4; surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard. edu).…”

Section: Measurement Of Rtmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Gray matter thickness was calculated as the closest distance between the gray/white matter boundary and the pial surface. We used the atlas of Destrieux et al (48) to match the DLPFC with the same region used in the earlier study (30). Specifically, the DLPFC was matched with regions 15 (middle frontal gyrus) in the atlas of Destrieux et al (48).…”

Section: Measurement Of Rtmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Different strategies are needed to promote prosocial behavior and to design institutions depending on the constitution of the population. showing that the thickness of the DLPFC and psychological measures of deliberative thinking are negatively related to the proportion of giving in the DG, but not in the UG (30). This finding implies that players of economic games use deliberation to assess the incentives (it is better for immediate self-interest not to give any portion of the monetary endowment to the recipient in the DG) rather than to read the respondent's reaction to secure their self-interest (according to which deliberative players with a thicker DLPFC who are capable of anticipating rejection of unfair offers by the respondent should make fairer offers than less deliberative players in the UG, but not in the DG).…”

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confidence: 90%

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Response time in economic games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals

Yamagishi

Matsumoto

Kiyonari

et al. 2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Behavioral and neuroscientific studies explore two pathways through which internalized social norms promote prosocial behavior. One pathway involves internal control of impulsive selfishness, and the other involves emotion-based prosocial preferences that are translated into behavior when they evade cognitive control for pursuing self-interest. We measured 443 participants' overall prosocial behavior in four economic games. Participants' predispositions [social value orientation (SVO)] were more strongly reflected in their overall game behavior when they made decisions quickly than when they spent a longer time. Prosocially (or selfishly) predisposed participants behaved less prosocially (or less selfishly) when they spent more time in decision making, such that their SVO prosociality yielded limited effects in actual behavior in their slow decisions. The increase (or decrease) in slower decision makers was prominent among consistent prosocials (or proselfs) whose strong preference for prosocial (or proself) goals would make it less likely to experience conflict between prosocial and proself goals. The strong effect of RT on behavior in consistent prosocials (or proselfs) suggests that conflict between prosocial and selfish goals alone is not responsible for slow decisions. Specifically, we found that contemplation of the risk of being exploited by others (social risk aversion) was partly responsible for making consistent prosocials (but not consistent proselfs) spend longer time in decision making and behave less prosocially. Conflict between means rather than between goals (immediate versus strategic pursuit of self-interest) was suggested to be responsible for the time-related increase in consistent proselfs' prosocial behavior. The findings of this study are generally in favor of the intuitive cooperation model of prosocial behavior.prosocial behavior | economic game | social value orientation | decision time | heuristic cooperation T he question of how humans succeeded in creating and maintaining large-scale cooperation has occupied social and biological scientists for the past few centuries (1-8). Social scientists traditionally sought answers to this question by focusing on the critical role of internalized social norms that constitute the internal norm enforcement system (1-3). Recent neuroscientific and behavioral studies extended this traditional normenforcement view of human prosociality in two directions. The first direction is to identify the neural mechanisms exerting cognitive control of the selfish drive. Neuroscientists have found structural and neural correlates of prosocial and norm-enforcing choices in economic games. Experimental evidence shows that prosocial choices in economic games are positively related to cortical gray matter volume, cortical thickness, and activation of the brain areas that exert control over selfish impulsive drives, such as the anterior cingulate cortex (9, 10), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (11-13), and temporoparietal junction (14). Impairment of the DLPFC...

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Section: Cognitive Intervention Reduces Prosocial Behavior When Decismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Measurement Of Rtmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Measurement Of Rtmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 90%

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Response time in economic games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals

Yamagishi

Matsumoto

Kiyonari

et al. 2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…In contrast, a driving force of cooperation in my model is coordination of behavior based on negotiation and pre-commitments. Therefore, its scope of application is rather cognitionbased cooperation (and defection), which characterizes another aspect of human sociality (Knoch et al, 2006;Baumgartner et al, 2011;Ruff et al, 2013;Yamagishi et al, 2016).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Dynamics of Coordinated Cooperation

Ohtsuki

2018

Front. Ecol. Evol.

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In social evolution theory, unconditional cooperation has been seen as an evolutionarily unsuccessful strategy unless there is a mechanism that promotes positive assortment between like individuals. One such example is kin selection, where individuals sharing common ancestry and therefore having the same strategy are more likely to interact with each other. Conditional cooperation, on the other hand, can be successful if interactions with the same partners last long. In many previous models, it has been assumed that individuals act conditionally on the past behavior of others. Here I propose a new model of conditional cooperation, namely the model of coordinated cooperation. Coordinated cooperation means that there is a negotiation before an actual game is played, and that each individual can flexibly change their decision, either to cooperation or to defection, according to the number of those who show the intention of cooperation/defection. A notable feature of my model is that individuals play an actual game only once but can still use conditional strategies. Since such a negotiation is cognitively demanding, the target of my model here is exclusively human behavior. I have analyzed cultural evolutionary dynamics of conditional strategies in this framework. Results for an infinitely large population show that conditional cooperation not only works as a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, but sustains a polymorphic attractor with unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators being present. A finite population analysis is also performed. Overall, my results provide one explanation of why people tend to take into account others' decisions even when doing so gives them no payoff consequences at all.

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Multi‐voxel pattern analysis of amygdala functional connectivity at rest predicts variability in posttraumatic stress severity

et al. 2020

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Introduction Resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rsfMRI) studies demonstrate that individuals with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) exhibit atypical functional connectivity (FC) between the amygdala, involved in the generation of emotion, and regions responsible for emotional appraisal (e.g., insula, orbitofrontal cortex [OFC]) and regulation (prefrontal cortex [PFC], anterior cingulate cortex). Consequently, atypical amygdala FC within an emotional processing and regulation network may be a defining feature of PTSD, although altered FC does not seem constrained to one brain region. Instead, altered amygdala FC involves a large, distributed brain network in those with PTSD. The present study used a machine‐learning data‐driven approach, multi‐voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), to predict PTSD severity based on whole‐brain patterns of amygdala FC. Methods Trauma‐exposed adults ( N = 90) completed the PTSD Checklist‐Civilian Version to assess symptoms and a 5‐min rsfMRI. Whole‐brain FC values to bilateral amygdala were extracted and used in a relevance vector regression analysis with a leave‐one‐out approach for cross‐validation with permutation testing (1,000) to obtain significance values. Results Results demonstrated that amygdala FC predicted PCL‐C scores with statistically significant accuracy ( r = .46, p = .001; mean sum of squares = 130.46, p = .001; R 2 = 0.21, p = .001). Prediction was based on whole‐brain amygdala FC, although regions that informed prediction (top 10%) included the OFC, amygdala, and dorsolateral PFC. Conclusion Findings demonstrate the utility of MVPA based on amygdala FC to predict individual severity of PTSD symptoms and that amygdala FC within a fear acquisition and regulation network contributed to accurate prediction.

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Cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicts strategic choices in economic games

Cited by 85 publications

References 57 publications

Response time in economic games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals

Response time in economic games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals

Evolutionary Dynamics of Coordinated Cooperation

Multi‐voxel pattern analysis of amygdala functional connectivity at rest predicts variability in posttraumatic stress severity

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