Cost Allocation in Common Facilities Sharing

Abstract

Briata, F. and Fragnelli, V. [2017] Free-riding in common facility sharing, in Transaction on Computation Collective Intelligence XXVII, pp. 129–138. dealt with the inefficiency and the free-riding situations that may arise from sharing the maintenance cost of a facility among its potential users and from dividing the cost of a check to assess who the users are among the agents that asked for it.They introduced two mechanisms for reducing the free-riding behaviors and considered the possibility that the check provides also information on the level at which the facility is used by each agent. In this paper, we improve the profitability of the check, introducing a TU-cost game for determining the quota of the total cost assigned to each agent in order to satisfy as many agents as possible. Two solutions are proposed and analyzed and the balancedness of the TU-cost game is studied and characterized.