2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.06.002
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Cost-efficient Performance-Vesting Equity

Abstract: We analyse the incentive effects of the Performance-Vesting Equity (PVE) component of executive pay that is characterised by zero exercise price and performance-contingent vesting. We demonstrate how PVE with upward-sloping convex/concave vesting curves can be a more efficient risk-sharing and incentive alignment device than strictly convex stock options.

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Cited by 1 publication
(1 citation statement)
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“…They explained that a binding vote is likely to have more onerous consequences than a non-binding one. Skovoroda et al. (2018) warned that the potential “threat” of binding say on pay could weaken over time if shareholders do not actually exercise their voting power.…”
Section: Findings and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They explained that a binding vote is likely to have more onerous consequences than a non-binding one. Skovoroda et al. (2018) warned that the potential “threat” of binding say on pay could weaken over time if shareholders do not actually exercise their voting power.…”
Section: Findings and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%