Cost-sharing mechanism for product quality improvement in a supply chain under competition

Chakraborty, Tulika; Chauhan, Satyaveer Singh; Ouhimmou, Mustapha

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.12.015

Cited by 114 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Majumder and Srinivasan [22] studied the competition and leadership of network supply chains. Chakraborty et al [23] investigated the cost-sharing mechanism for product quality improvement in a supply chain under competition. Wang and Liu [24] studied vertical contract selection under chain-to-chain service competition in a shipping supply chain.…”

Section: Channel Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Channel Structure Strategies of Supply Chains with Varying Green Cost and Governmental Interventions

2019

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Environmental concerns make enterprises pay more attention to green manufacturing. The emerging green supply chain inevitably will compete with the traditional supply chain. In order to evaluate the competitiveness of supply chains and the impact on channel structure strategy, we develop four game models for two competing supply chains according to their channel structure strategies. Green marginal manufacturing cost, demand sensitivity of green level, and governmental interventions are considered. We study how retail prices, green levels, and profits are influenced by channel structure choice and governmental interventions. Analytical results indicate that the substitutability of products affects channel structure strategy. When the substitutability of products is relatively low, centralization-centralization is the unique Nash equilibrium. However, when the substitutability of products is relatively high, both centralization-centralization and decentralization-decentralization are the Nash equilibriums. Centralization-centralization is a prisoner dilemma, while decentralization-decentralization can make the green supply chain achieve optimal profit. Then, the green marginal manufacturing cost and demand sensitivities of the green level play important but different roles in channel structure strategy of the competing supply chains. Further, whether Nash equilibriums are the optimal strategy depends on governmental intervention. Relatively severe governmental intervention might realize a relatively higher green level, but may not always achieve the lowest retail price for the green supply chain. However, a relatively moderate governmental intervention might achieve a relatively lower green level.

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Section: Channel Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Channel Structure Strategies of Supply Chains with Varying Green Cost and Governmental Interventions

2019

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“…They constructed five different scenarios -centralized, decentralized or Nash game as well as three different Stackelberg games, which are led by the manufacturer, retailer and third party respectively. Chakraborty et al [4] studied how a retailer and each of two competing manufacturers can be beneficial under the strategy of improving collaborative product quality in the supply chain. Two competing manufacturers make investment in their respective product to improve quality and a common retailer sells substitutable products with higher quality to the end customers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing strategies of product quality and price based on trust under different power structures

Liu

Shen

et al. 2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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This paper investigates the quality and pricing decisions in a supply chain consists of one retailer and two manufacturers. The retailer updates the trust value to manufacturers based on the historical information of product quality to determine the actual order quantity. We propose four game models by considering two situations, i.e., manufacturer-dominant scenario and retailer-dominant scenario. Based on theoretical and numerical analysis， we obtain a series of valuable management insights. For example, when a manufacturer with unreliable product quality is the leader and competes with another reliable manufacturer, the retailer’s profit would eventually surpass that of two stronger manufacturers. When the retailer is the leader, the retailer’s profit is often greater when two manufacturers engage in the Stackelberg game rather than that in Bertrand game, and the manufacturer with unreliable product quality can make profit no less than that of another manufacturer with reliable quality.

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“…Demand for each product is proportional with the green quality level sensitivity (γ) of that product and price sensitivity (β) of the other product, and inversely proportional with own price and green quality level sensitivity (δ) of the other product [32,45]. In above demand function, if β = δ = 0, it is similar to [46].…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of Strategic Cooperation under Competition on Green Product Manufacturing

et al. 2020

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This study explores the optimal pricing and investment decision for two competing green supply chains, both consisting of a manufacturer and an exclusive retailer. Our focus is to explore, does the strategic integration decision with rivals at the horizontal level or with partners at the vertical level have any effect on green product types? The results reveal the following insights: retailer-retailer strategic integration at downstream level leads to a sub-optimal total supply chain profit and green quality level for a development-intensive green product. Two competing manufacturers can produce products at a higher level if they are vertically integrated with respective retailers. Manufacturer-manufacturer integration at upstream level sometimes leads to higher profits and product quality level if cross price-elasticity of consumers is high. However, an opposite phenomenon is observed while they are selling for a marginal-intensive green product, horizontal integration can improve green quality levels, but supply chain members will receive a lower profit. Therefore, selection of green product types and strategic integration decision are interrelated to achieve the profit maximization goal along with the aim to offer products at a higher green quality level. Vertical integration strategy can outperform horizontal integration strategy, especially if cross-price elastic for green products remain high.

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Cost-sharing mechanism for product quality improvement in a supply chain under competition

Cited by 114 publications

References 34 publications

Channel Structure Strategies of Supply Chains with Varying Green Cost and Governmental Interventions

Channel Structure Strategies of Supply Chains with Varying Green Cost and Governmental Interventions

Managing strategies of product quality and price based on trust under different power structures

Impact of Strategic Cooperation under Competition on Green Product Manufacturing

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